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All cash value insurance provides both insurance and
investment. Federal income tax law allows individuals to
defer paying tax on investment returns accruing inside such
contracts (the "inside buildup") and to exclude from income
life insurance death benefits.1 Variable insurance contracts
generate risk-related returns rather than the guaranteed,
but low, returns of more traditional products. 2 Variable
insurance contracts work well only for a fairly narrow range
of individuals, and these contracts are susceptible to being
marketed and sold to less affluent taxpayers for whom such
contracts are unsuitable investments. 3 For more affluent
taxpayers, variable insurance may make financial sense,
but this group may not wish to settle for investing in
standard variable contracts and may instead buy into
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1. See infra Part I.B for an overview of the tax rules applicable to life
insurance and annuity contract owners.
2. See Charlene D. Luke, Beating the "Wrap"- The Agency Effort to Control
Wraparound Insurance Tax Shelters, 25 VA. TAX. REV. 129, 135, 139 (2005).
3. See Joseph B. Treaster, Insurers Want Their Say in Social Security
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2005, at C3 (describing congressional objections to
adding to the tax benefits already enjoyed by variable annuities); see also infra
notes 75-84 and accompanying text (discussing high fees and aggressive
marketing tactics connected with variable insurance).
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variable contracts characterized as wraparound tax
shelters. 4
As a method of addressing the investment suitability
and tax shelter problems associated with variable
insurance, I propose current taxation of variable contracts'
risk-related returns but continued tax deferral for a
deemed, risk-free return amount.5 Preservation of tax
deferral for a portion of the inside buildup may seem an
unorthodox way of implementing insurance tax reform
since such deferral represents a departure from the Haig-
Simons income tax ideal.6 Yet the likelihood of broader
reform is low-in spite of the inadequate justifications
supporting the tax deferral on inside buildup. 7 My proposal
is offered as a reasonably politically-palatable approach to
reform of a problematic insurance product.
4. Through this technique, individuals convert a high tax rate to a lower one
by wrapping income-producing assets in a variable contract. In the most recent
iteration, individuals wrapped hedge fund interests, which tend to generate
highly taxed ordinary income, in variable contracts. See Luke, supra note 2, at
174-83. The use of the term "tax shelter" is itself problematic as there is no
general agreement on what types of transactions should be given this label. See
JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE
DEBATE OVER TAXES 280 (3d ed. 2004) ("[T]here is no consensus on how to even
define tax shelter."). I apply the term to the wraparound technique because the
technique is used by sophisticated, wealthy individuals in order to obtain
arbitrage and deferral tax benefits. See id. (describing tax arbitrage and
deferral of taxes as frequent tax avoidance "principles"). This Article does not
consider whether particular versions of the wraparound insurance shelter
would be "reportable transactions" under Internal Revenue Code section 6011.
5. My proposal preserves other areas of favorable tax treatment for
insurance contracts-including implicit deductibility of insurance costs,
treatment of cash value withdrawals for life insurance, and the exclusion of life
insurance death benefits. See infra Part I.B.
6. For a discussion of Haig-Simons literature, see infra note 197 and
accompanying text. This Article does not address the normative question of
whether we should have an income or a consumption tax. The current tax
treatment of insurance products is clearly more readily justified under a
consumption tax norm. See C. David Anderson, Conventional Tax Theory and
'Tax Expenditures" A Critical Analysis of the Life Insurance Example, 57 TAX
NOTES 1417, 1419-21 (1992) (describing the proper treatment of life insurance
under a consumption tax and arguing that most long-term investment is
currently taxed on consumption tax basis).
7. See Luke, supra note 2, at 140-42 (briefly critiquing policy justifications
made to support the tax preferences granted life insurance and annuities); infra
notes 18-21 and accompanying text. But see Anderson, supra note 6, at 1425-26
(arguing that life insurance taxation already largely complies with income tax
norms given inflation and frequent policy cancellations).
TAXING RISK
First, implementation of my proposal should lead to
increased transparency through forcing separate tax
accounting of contract components, which should in turn
improve consumers' ability to assess contracts and may also
lead to lower fees by fostering competition.8 Current
taxation of risk-related returns should also make it more
difficult for insurance sellers to tout variable contracts for
their tax benefits to individuals for whom such tax benefits
would be largely illusory. Finally, current taxation of risk-
related returns removes an apparently key shelter
incentive-the promise of a lower nominal tax rate on risky
returns than that which is available outside variable
insurance contracts. As a result, my proposal should make
it possible to eliminate costs imposed as a result of the
government's response to the wraparound shelter.
This last point-that the proposal removes a shelter
incentive-requires, however, further elaboration in light of
the literature on the taxation of risk. This literature (which
I will refer to as "Domar-Musgrave" in reference to the
authors of the formative article in this area, Evsey D.
Domar and Richard A. Musgrave), posits that, given certain
assumptions, taxpayers effectively do not pay tax on risk-
related returns under a normative, flat-rate income tax.9
The principal assumptions required for this result are that
losses be fully deductible and refundable, gains and losses
be taxed at the same rate, and taxpayers adjust their
investment portfolios sufficiently to negate the effect of any
nominal tax on risk.10
In the real world, numerous loss limitation rules apply,
progressive rates may cause gains and losses to be taxed
differently, and taxpayers may not make the necessary
8. In term life, for example, greater access to pricing information has led to
lower rates. See KENNETH BLACK, JR. & HAROLD D. SKIPPER, JR., LIFE & HEALTH
INSURANCE 77 (13th ed. 2000) ("[T]he term market [is] more price competitive
than the market for cash-value policies.").
9. Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation
and Risk-Taking, 58 Q.J. ECON. 388 (1944).
10. See Lawrence Zelenak, The Sometimes-Taxation of the Returns to Risk-
Bearing Under A Progressive Income Tax, 59 SMU L. REV. 879, 879 (2006). In
addition, the Domar-Musgrave model also assumes indexation for inflation. See
Noel B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax
Base, 52 TAx L. REV. 17, 22 (1996); Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax
With a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423, 430 (2000).
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portfolio adjustments because of transaction cost and
informational hurdles. As a result, even though Domar-
Musgrave results hold given the existence of various
preconditions, at least some risk-related returns are taxed
under our current income tax system." Because of the
problems associated with pinning down the real world
implications of Domar-Musgrave, using it to inform
incremental reform proposals remains unusual. 12 Yet, its
theoretical correctness suggests that it should be taken into
consideration-particularly in those situations where the
necessary preconditions for its results are most likely to be
met.
Tax shelter reform seems particularly ripe for
examination in light of Domar-Musgrave since tax shelters
are generally marketed to the group of taxpayers most
likely to be able to satisfy the preconditions to the effective
non-taxation of risk. That is, tax shelters are generally
purchased by sophisticated, affluent taxpayers who are
most able to avoid loss limitation rules, have income that
puts them beyond the point where additional marginal rate
changes may result in a different nominal rate for gains
and losses, and are most able to make the necessary
portfolio adjustments.1 3  Indeed, perhaps many tax
avoidance techniques, including the wraparound insurance
shelter, can be explained in terms of enabling taxpayers to
satisfy the necessary preconditions for Domar-Musgrave
results (i.e., the non-taxation of risk).
11. Professor Weisbach has recently stated that these precondition
assumptions may not be as unrealistic as may first appear. David A. Weisbach,
The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 TAx L. REV. 1, 5 (2004).
12. See David M. Schizer, Balance in the Taxation of Derivative Securities:
An Agenda for Reform, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1886, 1891 (2004) (noting that "the
theory has inspired little by way of concrete reform proposals"). For examples of
proposals drawing on Domar-Musgrave, see Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective
Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 167 (1991); David F. Bradford,
Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency and Correctness in the
Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 TAX. L. REV. 731 (1995); Schizer, supra.
13. See Cunningham, supra note 10, at 38 ("[I]f a normative proportional
income tax were in place, a sophisticated investor could reduce the impact of the
tax on capital income so that only the risk-free rate of return (or her borrowing
rate) on her net capital investment would be burdened by the tax."); Schenk,
supra note 10, at 429 (describing how sophisticated investors and established
firms are able to neutralize loss limitation rules); id. at 431-35 (discussing how




Assuming tax shelter clients are in a good position to
avoid paying tax on risk, the question then becomes
whether incremental reform should make obtaining such a
result more or less difficult. Though this Article does not
take up an in-depth discussion of this preliminary
normative question, the details of my proposal are guided
by the view that, to the extent possible, incremental reform
should adhere to a normative income tax, which (in theory)
should have the effect of facilitating Domar-Musgrave
results. 14 The details of my proposal also, however, reflect
the uncertainty and controversy surrounding Domar-
Musgrave's real world effects. That is, a proposal directly
implementing Domar-Musgrave would likely impose fewer
administrative costs than my proposal. 15 For example, as
discussed by Professor Schizer, ensuring a zero tax rate for
risk-related inside buildup would conform to Domar-
Musgrave. 16
My proposal is designed to accommodate a range of
views on the real world effects of Domar-Musgrave. That is,
if one assumes that risky returns are meaningfully taxed,
my proposal removes a shelter incentive-the promise of a
lower tax on risky returns than that which is available
outside variable insurance contracts. If, on the other hand,
one assumes that risky returns are untaxed, my proposal
provides a politically feasible way of removing unnecessary
anti-shelter provisions and should not substantially affect
taxpayers' ability to make the portfolio adjustments
necessary to reach Domar-Musgrave results with respect to
variable insurance risky returns. 17
14. For discussion of some of the policy questions raised by Domar-
Musgrave, see generally Cunningham, supra note 10, at 17; Schenk, supra note
10, at 428; Weisbach, supra note 11; Zelenak, supra note 10.
15. Cf. Weisbach, supra note 11, at 3 ("[I]f we are only going to tax the risk-
free rate of return to capital, there are a variety of ways of doing so that might
be much cheaper to administer than a Haig-Simons system.").
16. Schizer, supra note 12, at 1936 (explaining that a "provocative
implication" of Domar-Musgrave analysis is that hedge fund life insurance
"investments do not require special attention"). As will be described infra Part
I.B, while a zero rate is a possibility under cash value life insurance, it is far
from assured; annuities do not currently provide the potential for a zero rate.
17. A further implication of Domar-Musgrave is that a generous (and in
some cases only available) tax preference for investment returns would be a
benefit for risk-free returns. Thus, my proposal also provides an exploration of
how a subsidy might be constructed consistently with Domar-Musgrave effects.
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Part I of this Article provides an overview of insurance
terms and contract owner taxation. Part I also analyzes
prior variable and nonvariable insurance reforms, including
those aimed at curtailing wraparound shelters. The details
of my proposal are provided in Part II, which also explores
some potential objections to it (other than those relating
directly to Domar-Musgrave). Part III provides background
on the Domar-Musgrave theory and discusses its
application to incremental reform and to my proposal.
I. VARIABLE INSURANCE: TAX STRUCTURE AND POLICY
The congressional approach to hybrid insurance-
investment products has been to preserve the core tax
benefits long provided to mortality insurance products
deferral of tax on investment buildup and exclusion of
death benefits, for life insurance. Although these tax
benefits are frequently criticized as introducing ineffectual
economic distortion'8 and as skewing unfairly towards
See infra text accompanying note 238. Whether such a subsidy is advisable in
this setting is another matter. See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
18. The tax treatment of life insurance and annuity contracts deviates from
the Haig-Simon model in order to further the policy goal of encouraging
taxpayer economic preparation. Yet, it is unclear whether the tax benefits
granted to cash value insurance and annuities have had these intended effects.
See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 16-17 (explaining that people "often
avoid or purchase insufficient amounts of death, disability, and long-term care
protection"); David F. Bradford, The Case for a Personal Consumption Tax, in
WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? 75, 90-91 (Joseph A.
Pechman ed., 1980) (discussing taxation of cash value insurance as a complex
income tax problem); Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation
Without Realization: A "Revolutionary" Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV.
725, 798-99 (1992) (questioning current treatment of life insurance products);
Kyle D. Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law Should
Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 26 (2001) ("[AIll of the academic studies of life-
insurance adequacy have concluded that life-insurance "inadequacy" is
pervasive and in some cases severe."); Luke, supra note 2, at 141 (describing the
inside buildup tax preference as "supported by flimsy justifications"); Andrew
D. Pike, Reflections on the Meaning of Life: An Analysis of Section 7702 and the
Taxation of Cash Value Life Insurance, 43 TAX L. REV. 491, 528-32 (1988)
(describing problems with the current treatment of life insurance); Tommy F.
Thompson, Nonqualified Deferred Variable Annuities: A Product in Search of a
Coherent Theory, 79 N.D. L. REV. 439, 461 (2003) (describing a study identifying
factors that explain "the general reluctance of individuals to annuitize their
retirement wealth"); William Vickrey, Insurance Under the Federal Income Tax,
52 YALE L.J. 554, 561 (1943) ("[T]he savings part of the life insurance contract
should obviously be treated as any other form of savings . . . ."). But see
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benefiting the wealthy, 19 the prospect of complete removal
of these benefits is low. 20 The insurance lobby is strong, 21 as
is congressional desire to aid (or to appear to aid)
individuals in their economic preparations for retirement
and death. Periodically, Congress has, however, acted to
prevent insurance products from becoming overly
investment oriented--or overly prone to use in tax shelters.
The first two sections below describe basic distinctions
among insurance products and basic tax treatment. These
are followed by an examination and critique of
congressional and administrative intervention in insurance
contract taxation-with emphasis on measures aimed at
variable insurance. 22
Anderson, supra note 6, at 1418-19 (criticizing the conventional view on cash
value life insurance). See also Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the
Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk?
Does It Matter?, 47 TAx L. REV. 377, 385-86 (1992) (describing the complexity of
determining the effect of tax on saving in "the real world"); Logue, supra, at 27
(explaining that it would be a "mistake" to conclude that studies on
underinsurance are alone "sufficient to warrant a call for swift government
intervention").
19. Term life insurance does not receive the benefit of deferral on inside
buildup, since it does not generate inside buildup. See infra Part I.A. Term life
insurance will be more affordable for young families than cash value insurance.
In addition, cash value life insurance and annuity contract owners receive
implicit, "above-the-line" deductions for various contract costs. See infra Part
I.B. Such deductions are more valuable to those in higher rate brackets. Pike,
supra note 18, at 532 ("[T]he tax incentives apply in an upside-down manner:
The greatest benefits inure to the wealthiest taxpayers who have the least need
for insurance protection; smaller, but still important, benefits flow to those
whose insurance needs are modest; and those whose insurance needs are
greatest receive no benefit at all.").
20. See Pike, supra note 18, at 578 ("[B]ecause the preferential tax
treatment of cash value life insurance is based more on politics than on tax
policy analysis," broad-based reform is unlikely.).
21. See Luke, supra note 2, at 142 & n.58 (describing the insurance lobby);
Treaster, supra note 3, at C3 (noting that the main insurer trade association
spent $9.1 million on lobbying in 2004, which was "up 54 percent from the
previous year").
22. This Article addresses only individual, commercial products, not group
or split-dollar arrangements or private annuities.
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A. Insurance Product Basics
1. Life Insurance. Individuals are able to manage
mortality uncertainty and enhance utility through the
purchase of life insurance. 23 Traditionally, individuals
receive a particular death benefit for a certain price (the
premium)-a price which provides individuals with the
ability to make current consumption decisions with less
concern about untimely death.24 Even with traditional
contracts some uncertainty and risk will remain, for
example, the credit risk associated with a particular
insurance company. More modern insurance
arrangements-in particular, variable insurance-shift all
or part of the investment risk from the insurance company
to the contract owners. Life insurance products thus may be
viewed as falling along a continuum-ranging from pure
insurance to products approaching pure investment.
Term life is at one end of this continuum. It provides
coverage for a limited period of time, one year, for
example, 25 and is often characterized as "pure" insurance.
Generally, the premium pays only for the current term's
mortality costs and other administrative expenses without
any premium remaining to cover a future term's costs.
Mortality costs depend on the statistical likelihood of a
particular number of deaths occurring within a particular
insurance classification. 26 The more precise a classification,
the more precise can be the pricing-with the important
caveat that a particular classification must yield a group
large enough so that the actual number of deaths will not
significantly differ from the statistically expected number.27
While term insurance is often the most affordable for
relatively young individuals, the cost of purchasing it
23. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 20-22 (summarizing research on
insurance in the context of consumption theories).
24. See id. at 18-22 (summarizing various consumption models and their
application to life insurance and annuities).
25. See id. at 77-87 (describing various aspects of term life insurance); Pike,
supra note 18, at 497-98 (describing the same). This description applies only to
single-payment, non-renewable term contracts. Guaranteed, renewable term or
level-premium term contracts will have differing characteristics.
26. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 26-27.
27. See id. at 28.
258 [Vol. 55
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increases with age since the risk of death also increases
with age.28
Traditional cash value insurance allows an individual
to maintain a particular amount of insurance coverage as
she ages without triggering premium increases. Such a
contract requires the insured to pay larger premiums
during her younger years than would be required for term
insurance providing a comparable death benefit. The
premium covers current mortality costs and contract
expenses but is large enough so that even after payment of
these costs an amount remains that is, in effect, invested
with the insurance company. With the passage of time, the
death benefit is covered by both a decreasing insurance
component and an increasing savings portion-the cash
value. 29 As a result, if the insured dies close to the contract
maturity date, almost all of the death benefit will be paid
out of the savings accumulation and not as a "pure"
insurance payment.
In other words, cash value insurance contracts can be
thought of as consisting of an increasing savings account
and a decreasing term life insurance contract. 30 Thus,
individuals can create the equivalent of a cash value
insurance policy through a "buy-term-and-invest-the-rest"
strategy. 31 The use of cash value insurance contract may,
however, help individuals better meet their goals since it
may serve as a savings commitment device. 32 In addition,
the insurance company will be able to determine more
28. See id. at 30-32.
29. See id. at 35.
30. Id. at 37. The same principles generally apply whether the cash value
contract is whole life (a single- or level-premium contract) or universal life
(flexible premium contract). This Article generally will not distinguish among
types of nonvariable cash value contracts. See id. at 38-39 (explaining that
traditional cash value and universal life policies share the same "fundamental
nature").
31. See Tommy F. Thompson, The Tax Advantaged Treatment of Life
Insurance, 4 TAx L.J. 27, 43-44 (1989). Direct comparisons between term and
cash value insurance are made more difficult by various selection bias
problems. For example, companies tend to have better mortality experience
with buyers of cash value insurance than with term buyers.
32. See Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological
Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1314 (1991) (describing
precommitment mechanisms in retirement savings law).
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easily than an individual the mix between insurance and
savings that will provide the individual with her preferred
death benefit coverage. That is, the insurance company
guarantees that the premium will be sufficient to cover the
mortality costs, and it bears the risk that the rate of return
on the savings component of a traditional cash value policy
will be adequate to ensure the death benefit level. In order
to minimize its investment risk, an insurance company will
typically guarantee only a conservative rate of return.33
Variable life insurance34 is a more modern type of cash
value insurance. It allows the contract holder to obtain risk-
based returns on their premium investments. In a typical
commercial variable contract, after payment of current
contract expenses, the contract owner will allocate
remaining premium (and accumulated inside buildup)
among various funds, which are generally mutual fund
equivalents. 35 Insurance companies do not have to create
33. A book published in 2000, for example, put typical guaranteed rates for
flexible-premium cash value contracts at between four and five percent and for
flexible-premium deferred annuities at between three and 4.5 percent. BLACK &
SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 122-23 ("Guaranteed rates [for universal life] of 4 to 5
percent are commonly found."); id. at 170 (Flexible premium deferred annuity
"contracts typically guarantee a minimum interest rate, which is often within
the 3.0 to 4.5 percent range . . . ."). In addition to the guaranteed rates,
however, many nonvariable insurance products are available that offer interest-
sensitive return adjustments in order to provide contract holders more
protection against interest rate increases (and prevent flight from insurance
contracts during such interest rate changes). See id. at 122-23 (describing
mechanisms employed in universal life policies to adjust for changes in interest
rates); id. at 97 (describing current assumption whole life as providing interest-
sensitive coverage); id. at 170 (describing use of bonus rates used by some
issuers of flexible-premium deferred annuity contracts). Participating insurance
contracts serve a similar function. See id. at 39-40 (describing participating
policies and current assumption policies, both of which "allow policy values to
deviate from those illustrated at policy inception-both favorably and
unfavorably"); Pike, supra note 18, at 514 (describing dividends available under
participating cash value policies). Further, if the life insurance company issuing
the policy is a mutual life insurance company the policyholders have an equity
interest in the company in addition to their contractual interest. BLACK &
SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 252.
34. As with traditional cash value life insurance, variable life insurance is
offered through level premium policies and through flexible premiums. This
Article will generally not distinguish between level premium and flexible
premium plans.
35. Insurers routinely seek to expand the types of assets underlying
contracts. See Kathy Chu, Insurers Try to Simplify Annuities: Asset-Allocation
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and manage these funds, but rather may contract with
independent investment advisors. 36 Such outside advisors
have assumed much of the work of creating and monitoring
the funds underlying variable contracts.
The contract's cash value will fluctuate based on the
performance of these underlying funds. 37 In addition, the
death benefit (or alternatively, the amount at risk38 ) will
also vary depending on the performance of the funds. 39
Because the value of the contract is tied to underlying
investments, the variable contract functions as a
derivative-a financial instrument whose value is derived
from some other asset.40
Except to the extent a contract holder purchases a
minimum guarantee as to death benefit or cash value, 41 all
of the investment risk is shifted from the life insurance
company to the contract holder. Because of this shift in risk,
Funds Make Way Into Investment Vehicle Criticized for Hefty Fees, Complex
Structure, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2005, at R3.
36. 26 U.S.C. § 817(h)(5) (2000).
37. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 102 (describing variance of cash
value in fixed-premium variable life contracts); id. at 128 (describing cash value
fluctuation in flexible premium variable life contracts).
38. The net amount at risk is the difference between the death benefit and
the contract cash value. The larger the net amount at risk, the more expensive
the mortality costs. Id. at 117-18 (describing the net amount at risk and its
effect on the mortality charge amount).
39. See id. at 102 (explaining as to fixed-premium variable life contracts
that the death benefit, except to the extent of a minimum guarantee, fluctuates
with the performance of the funds underlying the contract); id. at 128
(explaining that with respect to flexible premium variable life contracts, the
contract holder can choose whether the death benefit or the net amount at risk
will fluctuate).
40. See Schizer, supra note 12, at 1935 (describing the relationship between
derivatives and wraparound insurance contracts).
41. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 102 (explaining that fixed-
premium variable life contracts provide a guaranteed minimum death benefit
and that some even provide a guaranteed minimum cash value); id. at 174
(explaining that although traditional deferred annuities typically guarantee a
minimum return, "[m]ost variable annuities do not contain these interest
guarantees"). Highly customized, private placement variable insurance
contracts (such as those used in the wraparound hedge fund shelter) do not
generally offer minimum guarantees. See Robert D. Colvin, Private Placement
Insurance Arrangements: Recent Developments Dictate a Fresh Look, 3 J. TAX'N
34, 36 (2004) ("[C]arriers offer no minimum investment guarantees on PPLI
[private placement life insurance] contracts.").
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the underlying funds as well as the variable contract itself
are subject to securities law regulation.42 This provides
contract owners with access to data on the investment to
which they may allocate premiums. The insurance
companies that sell variable insurance are generally
treated as broker-dealers. 43 Thus, from a securities law
perspective, variable insurance falls at the investment end
of the insurance/investment continuum.
2. Annuity Contracts. Annuitization allows individuals
to protect against outliving their assets through a
systematic, actuarially determined liquidation of these
assets.44 Thus, the mortality risk associated with annuity
contracts is that of prolonged life. In a traditional deferred
annuity contract, individuals make premium payments
during an accumulation phase.4 5 During the accumulation
phase, the contract is a savings vehicle and has little-if
any-insurance component. 46 In a traditional contract, the
insurance company guarantees a particular return on the
investment during this phase (and during payout if that
occurs). Mortality considerations come into play with the
payout phase.
The accumulated fund may be paid out over a certain
number of years or can be tied to one or more life
contingencies.4 7 In the case of annuitization tied to a life
contingency, the insurance company assumes the risk that
the contract owner will be long-lived. If the contract owner
dies before the fund is paid out, the remaining money
remains with the company unless the policy contains a
minimum return or death payment rider. Most individuals
choose not to enter a payout phase and instead withdraw
42. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 102-03 (explaining that the funds
investing contract holder assets are subject to the Investment Company Act of
1940 and that a variable life insurance contract is a security under the
Securities Act of 1933); id. at 177 (explaining that variable annuity contracts
are subject to the same securities laws as variable life contracts).
43. Id. at 103 (describing broker-dealer registration requirement for
distributors of variable insurance).
44. See id. at 162 (describing this purpose).
45. See id. An immediate annuity is one where the contract is fully funded
when purchased and annuitization payments begin shortly thereafter.
46. Id. at 298.
47. See id.
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their savings in a lump sum or in payments over a
relatively short period of time at the conclusion of the
accumulation phase (or earlier through contract
surrender).48
Deferred variable annuity contracts function similarly
to traditional deferred annuity contracts except that the
investment return is not guaranteed by the insurance
company. Rather, as with variable life insurance, the
contract owner is able to allocate premiums among various
investment funds, and the value of the contract's cash value
fluctuates with the value of the underlying investment
funds.49 Like variable life insurance, variable annuities are
subject to federal securities laws.50
B. Tax Rules
The investment return earned on the premiums paid
for qualifying annuity contracts and cash value life
insurance-called "inside buildup"-is not subject to
taxation until withdrawal. 51 As a result, investment returns
accumulate more quickly than would be the case if they
were subject to current taxation, such as in garden-variety
savings accounts. 52 Term life insurance does not receive the
benefit of deferral on inside buildup since there is
essentially no cash value to which the benefit could
attach.53 Death benefits paid on life insurance contracts are
48. See Thompson, supra note 18, at 460 (describing the "extremely small"
market for life annuities); see also Joseph B. Treaster, Variable Annuity Guide:
A Simple, Complex Idea, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2004, at G9 ("[O]nly 2 percent to
3 percent make use of' the life annuity option; instead "most people take their
money in a lump sum or in payments over... 5 or 10 years.").
49. See Luke, supra note 2, at 135-36.
50. See id. at 136-37.
51. Additional tax benefits applicable only to cash value life are discussed
infra Part I.C.
52. For example, if $100 is placed in a savings account paying 3 percent,
compounded annually, the $3 earned during the year will be subject to tax. If
the tax were one-third of the amount, that would leave only $102 on which to
earn interest in the subsequent year. If the $100 instead represented a net
premium investment in an insurance product, the $3 would not be taxed
currently and, thus, the subsequent year's return would be earned on all $103.
53. See supra Part L.A for a description of the differences between cash
value life insurance and term insurance.
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generally excluded from federal income tax.54 Benefits paid
on the death of an annuity contract owner do not qualify for
this exclusion. 55
Although variable life insurance offers the potential for
a zero income tax rate, this result depends on the extent
pre-death withdrawals exceed the contract holder's
investment in the contract. Pre-death withdrawals are
generally treated as coming first out of the nontaxable
investment in the contract rather than from the inside
buildup. 56 "Investment in the contract" is essentially
equivalent to the concept of basis.57 For example, for
purposes of determining the treatment of withdrawals, the
investment in the contract equals the consideration paid for
the contract less any amounts already received that were
excludable from income.58 As a result of this rule for
withdrawals, individuals are able to access cash value up to
the amount of their investment in the contract without
triggering tax. To the extent a withdrawal is subject to
taxation, ordinary income tax rates apply.59
54. See 26 U.S.C. § 101(a)(1) (2002 & Supp. 2006).
55. See 26 U.S.C. § 691(a). No step-up of basis to fair market value is
allowed with respect to such survivor benefits. See 26 U.S.C. § 1014(c); DODGE
ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 177 (3d ed.
2004) (describing the difference between life insurance proceeds and other
survivor benefits).
56. See 26 U.S.C. § 72(e)(5)(A), (C); Pike, supra note 18, at 503 (discussing
"stacking rule" applicable to life insurance contracts). If the life insurance
contract is a "modified endowment contract" this rule does not apply. See infra
Part I.C.1. The ability to take a pre-death withdrawal will depend on the terms
of the insurance contract. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 132 (partial
surrenders are not permitted with fixed variable life, only with variable
universal life).
57. For a discussion of problems with life insurance basis computation and
differences in treatment between surrenders and sales, see Mitchell M. Gans &
Jay A. Soled, A New Model for Identifying Basis in Life Insurance Policies:
Implementation and Deference, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 569, 571-72 (2006).
58. 26 U.S.C. § 72(e)(6) (2000).
59. In the case of policy sales, taxpayers have attempted to get capital gain
treatment to little avail. See Gans & Soled, supra note 57, at 10-12. Insurers
have recently lobbied to lower the tax rate to the same as that currently in
effect for qualified dividends and long-term capital gains. See Treaster, supra
note 3, at C3. Congress did not accede partly because so few individuals opt to
receive a stream of payments rather than a lump sum once the annuity contract
leaves the accumulation phase. See id.
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Loans secured by the cash value of qualified life
insurance contracts are not treated as withdrawals, and so
do not affect the investment in the contract,60 unless loans
are outstanding at the time of contract surrender. 61 In
addition, no penalty tax is assessed on early withdrawals
from qualified life insurance contracts. 62 In contrast, a 10
percent penalty tax is typically assessed on withdrawals
from other types of tax-preferred retirement vehicles, such
as 401(k)s, 63 if made before the age of fifty-nine and one
half.
The holders of deferred variable annuity contracts enjoy
only current income tax deferral on inside buildup; there is
no opportunity for permanent exclusion and the favorable
rules for life insurance withdrawals do not apply. Most
early withdrawals made during the accumulation phase of a
deferred annuity contract are subject to a ten percent
penalty.64 Further, such withdrawals are deemed to come
first out of the taxable inside buildup rather than the
nontaxable investment in the contract.65 Finally, loans tied
to annuity contract cash value (even if only through the
pledge of the cash value as collateral) are treated as
withdrawals. 66 Regular annuity payouts made after the
contract enters its payout phase are taxable under a
formula that allocates part of the payment to investment in
60. See 26 U.S.C. § 72(e)(5)(A), (C). These favorable rules do not apply if the
life insurance contract is a modified endowment contract ("MEC"). In general
terms, a MEC is a contract in which premium payments are excessively
frontloaded. See id. § 7702A.
61. That is, outstanding loans at surrender are treated as previously
excluded proceeds of the contract. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 318-19.
62. If the life insurance contract is a "modified endowment contract" the
penalty tax applies. See infra Part I.C.1.
63. See 26 U.S.C. § 72(t) (2000).
64. See id. § 72(q). The ability to make periodic cash value withdrawals will
depend on the terms of the contract and any riders. For example, insurers may
offer a minimum withdrawal benefit rider (at an additional cost) that allows
generous withdrawals during the accumulation phase. See Kathy Chu, New
Way to Guarantee Annuity Income: Regular Stream of Funds Assured Despite
Fluctuation of Market, But Feature Comes at a Price, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2005,
at R3.
65. See 26 U.S.C. § 72(e)(2)-(3) (2000).
66. See id. § 72(e)(4)(A).
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the contract and part to the inside buildup. 67 As with life
insurance, the taxable portion of a withdrawal or regular
annuity payment is taxed at ordinary income rates. 68
Deferral of tax on inside buildup for both life insurance
and annuities may be prolonged further through the tax-
free exchange of contracts. 69 A life insurance contract may
be exchanged tax free for another life insurance contract or
for an annuity contract.70 An annuity contract may only be
exchanged for another annuity contract.7 1 Although such
exchanges are income tax free, insurance companies may
charge fees for the exchange, and concerns about
unnecessary replacements periodically surface.7 2 In the case
of variable insurance contracts, individuals are able to
change their investment allocations without switching
policy contracts. Such allocation changes are not taxable, 73
but they may trigger administrative costs that are passed
on to the contract holder (though it is unlikely a direct
transfer fee will be charged). An individual switching
between mutual funds outside of a variable contract does
not have the ability to avoid tax recognition. 74
67. See id. § 72(b). If the annuitant dies after regular annuity payments
begin, a loss deduction is allowed on the final tax return of the decedent for the
amount of the unrecovered investment in the contract. See id. § 72(b)(3).
68. See Thompson, supra note 18, at 449-52.
69. See 26 U.S.C. § 1035.
70. See id. § 1035(a)(1).
71. Id. § 1035(a)(3).
72. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 305-08 (describing the debate
over contract replacement). Some insurance companies may, however, provide
incentives for making exchanges if the alternative is having the contract holder
leave the insurance sector altogether. See id. at 112 (explaining that in order to
facilitate policy exchanges, "[rieduced loadings may be offered on the new policy
or increased policy face amounts may be offered"); Jeff D. Opdyke, Annuity
Sales Face Crackdown by Regulators: As Complaints Rise, New Laws Seek to
Improve Risk Disclosure and Ease Withdrawal Penalties, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4,
2005, at D1 (describing how seniors may be encouraged "to switch from one
annuity to another, racking up big charges").
73. During the Clinton administration, changing this result was discussed.
See Bridget O'Brian & Vanessa O'Connell, Annuity Sales May Suffer in Clinton
Plan to Tax an Exchange Between Accounts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1998, at C1.
74. See Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Mutual Funds Seem Simple, Until It's Time
to Sell, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, at 24 (describing tax consequences of
exchanging one fund for another).
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Variable contracts are known for their high costs. 75
These costs can be divided into two categories: insurance
costs (e.g., mortality charges) and investment related costs
(e.g., investment management expenses). 76 Steep surrender
charges for early withdrawals may apply in addition to any
tax penalty.77 A portion of these high costs-particularly of
the investment-related costs-likely represents capture of
the tax benefits by the insurance companies and thereby
imposes an above-zero implicit rate of tax on investment
income. 78 As a result of these high fees, variable contracts
work well only for a narrow clientele.7 9  Insurance
companies may act to expand artificially the ownership of
variable products through aggressive marketing8 0 and lack
of adequate suitability reviews. Certainly, such allegations
have been made in the press and by contract owners-
particularly by senior contract owners who do not have the
long-term investment horizon necessary to benefit from
these investments.8 1
75. See, e.g., Jonathan Clements, Defending a Much-Maligned Investment:
When Variable Annuities Make Sense, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2004, at Di
(describing the "sky-high fees" of variable annuities).
76. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 128-29 (describing the mortality
charges, back- and front-end loads, management costs, and costs for other
guarantees associated with flexible-premium variable life policies); id. at 174
(describing back- and front-end loads for variable annuities).
77. See Treaster, supra note 48, at G9 (describing "penalties of up to 17
percent for early withdrawals").
78. See Lee Sheppard, Rationalizing the Taxation of Financial
Intermediaries, 73 TAX NOTES 733, 735-36 (Nov. 11, 1996) (explaining that
insurers "clawo back a lot of the tax benefit through hefty fees"); see also
MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH
118-20 (3d ed. 2005) (describing implicit taxes on tax-advantaged investments).
A similar phenomenon occurs with respect to tax-exempt bonds. SCHOLES ET AL.,
supra note 78, at 121 (describing implicit taxes associated with tax-exempt
bonds); Daniel N. Shaviro, The Story of Knetsch: Judicial Doctrines Combating
Tax Avoidance, in TAX STORIES 318 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2003) (describing tax-
exempt bonds as an exemption of "the tendency in some circumstances for
market forces to eliminate through price changes any after-tax benefit").
79. See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 78, at 130-32 (describing the formation of
clienteles in connection with implicit taxes).
80. See Angela Pruitt, NASD Rethinks Its Policy on Annuity Sales Practices,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2005, at D2 (describing the use of financial rewards and
prizes to "encourage the sale of annuities").
81. See SEC & NASD, EXAMINATION FINDINGS REGARDING BROKER-DEALER
SALES OF VARIABLE INSURANCE PRODUCTS (2004) (discussing concerns about the
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Although some companies have voluntarily been
moving toward lowering fees and simplifying their
contracts,8 2  state and federal regulators have been
gradually implementing new rules on variable annuities.83
For example, if the current set of National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) proposed rules is finalized,
sellers of deferred variable annuities will not be able to
recommend the purchase or exchange of such contracts
unless (in addition to other requirements) they have a
reasonable basis to believe that "[t]he customer would
benefit from the unique features of a deferred variable
annuity (e.g., tax-deferred growth, annuitization or a death
marketing and sale of variable insurance products to those for whom the
products would be unsuitable); Thompson, supra note 18, at 482 (discussing
high fees and suitability concerns associated with deferred variable annuities);
Gretchen Morgenson, Who's Preying on Your Grandparents?, N.Y. TIMES, May
15, 2005, § 3, at 1 ("[R]egulators ... say they are fielding more and more
complaints about aggressive sales practices by insurance companies that design
annuity products and by the people who sell them."); Pruitt, supra note 80, at
D2 (describing concern by state regulators that "seniors are often pushed to buy
annuities that are unsuitable for their retirement needs"); Joseph B. Treaster,
S.E.C. to Increase Scrutiny of Some Annuity Sales, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2004,
at C2 ("Officials at NASD and at the S.E.C. say they have received thousands of
complaints from people who say they did not understand how variable annuities
worked when they were encouraged to invest in them."); Treaster, supra note
48, at G9 (explaining that even though variable annuities work best for the
young and wealthy, according to a trade group, most variable annuity
customers are in their fifties and sixties and earn less than $75,000 a year). As
evidenced by declining inflows into variable annuities, the public may be
learning to be "more skeptical" of variable contracts, and variable annuities in
particular. See Jeff D. Opdyke, Variable-Annuity Inflows Dropped 49% Last
Year, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9. 2006, at D2.
82. See Erin E. Arvedlund, Variable-Annuity Charges Decline: Fidelity,
Raymond James Aim to Lower Fees as Industry Faces Pressure About Sales
Tactics, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2005, at B3; Diya Gullapalli, Financial Makeover,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2006, at R7 ("[A] host of companies have begun selling
variable annuities with lower costs."); Jeff D. Opdyke, Annuities Lighten Up:
New Entrants Add Flexibility, Slash Fees, Make it Simpler; Avoiding the
'Surrender'Fee, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2006, at B1.
83. See Gullapalli, supra note 82, at R7 (describing consideration of new
rules by SEC and state actions against "abusive sales tactics and onerous fees");
Opdyke, supra note 72, at D1 (describing state regulator actions); Jeff D.
Opdyke, Under Pressure, Insurers Push Rules on Annuity-Sales Tactics, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 11, 2005, at D2 (describing insurance industry support for model
regulations "to eliminate the most flagrant practices").
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benefit) .. "84 While such efforts are likely to improve
suitability discussions, the tax treatment of variable
contracts may be an overlooked contributor to the
problem.8 5
The tax treatment of contract costs does operate to
lower their amount, particularly for individuals in higher
tax brackets. Although personal insurance costs are not
deductible if paid for with after-tax dollars,8 6 payment of
these expenses through a cash value insurance contract
provides an implicit deduction. The insurance expenses
reduce the contract's cash value but do not affect the
investment in the contract (basis) for purposes of
determining the amount of gain on withdrawals or contract
surrender.8 7 As a result, the cash value used to pay contract
expenses is never taxed, and, since the taxpayer avoids
paying current contract expenses with post-tax funds, she is
receiving the equivalent of a current deduction for the
expenses. This treatment results in further inequity
between the tax treatment of term insurance and cash
84. Securities & Exchange Commission, Self-Regulatory Organizations:
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Notice of Filing Amendment
No. 2 to Proposed Rule Relating to Sales Practice Standards and Supervisory
Requirements for Transactions in Deferred Variable Annuities, 71 Fed. Reg.
36,840, at 36,840 (June 28, 2006). Additional requirements include that the
sellers reasonably believe that "[t]he customer has been informed of the
material features of a deferred variable annuity .... Id. These features include
the tax penalties and all charges and fees. The seller is also required to "make
reasonable efforts to obtain" information about the customer, including income,
investment objectives, investment experience, and investment time horizon. Id.
In addition, supervisory review is required. Id. at 36,841. In response to the
prior version of these rules, the SEC "received nearly 1500 comment letters"-
most expressing opposition to the rules. Id. at 36,842.
85. See infra Part I.C.2.
86. 26 U.S.C. § 264 (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(1); see also BLACK &
SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 311 (explaining that premiums for life insurance
policies are treated as nondeductible personal expenses); Pike, supra note 18, at
505-06 (explaining the same).
87. BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 127 ("expenses and mortality charges
for the policy are paid with before-tax income"); Pike, supra note 18, at 505
(explaining that this effectively provides a deduction for the cost of current
insurance protection). The possibility of deducting losses is considered infra
notes 100-05 and accompanying text. In the case of life insurance policy sales,
although the IRS has provided some indication that insurance protection costs
should reduce basis, the general treatment has been that insurance protection
costs do not reduce basis for purposes of determining gain. See generally Gans &
Soled, supra note 57, at 580-82.
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value insurance since term insurance premiums are paid
for out-of-pocket.8 8 Further, this tax treatment fails to
reflect the general tax principles that maintenance
expenses be excluded from basis and not produce
deductions if personal in nature.8 9
Investment-related expenses, on the other hand, are
generally deductible as expenses incurred in the production
of income.90 Such expenses are, however, rarely netted
against income, 91 which is what occurs in the case of
insurance contracts. Instead, investment expenses must
generally be taken as miscellaneous itemized deductions
subject to a two-percent-of-adjusted-gross-income floor and
to recapture under the alternative minimum tax.92 One
exception allows publicly offered mutual funds to pass net
investment income through to their shareholders. 93 Thus, to
the extent a variable contract makes use of clones of
publicly offered mutual funds, 94 the tax treatment of
contract investment expenses is comparable to that for such
88. In the case of withdrawals and policy surrenders, the statutory
definition of "investment in the contract" supports this basis result. In the case
of sales, the basis used by the IRS to compute gain and loss is not resolved. See
Gans & Soled, supra note 57, at 578. The IRS has been moving towards
reducing basis by insurance costs for purposes of measuring loss on sale of a
contract. Id. at 580-82.
89. See id.
90. 26 U.S.C. § 212 (2000).
91. See Leandra Lederman, The Entrepreneurship Effect: An Accidental
Externality in the Federal Income Tax, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1401, 1412-27 (2004)
(detailing various tax provisions that limit the deduction of investment
expenses).
92. See 26 U.S.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (2000) (disallowance of miscellaneous
itemized deductions under alternative minimum tax); 26 U.S.C. § 67 (2000) (two
percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.67-
1T(a)(1)(ii) (1988) (categorizing investment advisory expenses as miscellaneous
itemized deductions).
93. 26 U.S.C. § 67(c) (2000). "Publicly offered" requires that the mutual
fund's shares (1) be continuously offered pursuant to a public offering under
securities law, (2) be regularly traded on an established securities market, or (3)
be held by at least 500 persons. 26 U.S.C. § 67(c)(2)(B)(i) (2000).
94. As explained infra, in order for a variable contract to qualify for the tax
preferences described in this section, the underlying variable contract
investments funds may not actually be publicly offered. Clones of publicly
offered mutual funds are, however, acceptable so long as all the interests are
held only through variable contracts or by certain qualified persons. See infra
Part I.C.2.
TAXING RISK
funds. As described in greater detail in the next section, the
recent wraparound shelter utilized private placement hedge
funds.95 With respect to hedge fund expenses, the offset of
expenses against variable insurance cash value would
provide a better result than could be obtained for
management expenses incurred outside such contracts. 96
My proposal, as a matter of political expediency, preserves
the deductibility of all contract fees.
Because of the investment risk assumed by owners of
variable contracts, the question of the tax treatment of
contract losses is arguably more important than it is for
traditional contracts. Variable contract investment losses
incurred prior to withdrawal will reduce contract
investment gains; thus, variable contract losses are in effect
deductible to the extent of contract gains. The treatment of
a net loss upon complete surrender or sale of a variable
contract is less clear.97 The Code provides that individuals
may deduct "losses incurred in any transaction entered into
for profit."98 The extent to which this provision applies to
variable insurance products has not been directly
addressed. In the case of variable life insurance, support for
taking a loss deduction on contract surrender is weak.99 The
95. Hedge funds are now, however, subject to some additional regulatory
oversight under rules requiring hedge-funds to register as investment advisers;
several exceptions apply to this rule. See, e.g., Eleanor Laise & Rachel Emma
Silverman, Dissecting Hedge-Fund Secrets: Wealth-Managers Say SEC-
Required Revelations Won't Replace Due Diligence, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2006, at
B5 (describing these rules).
96. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
97. Not only because it is unclear whether such losses pass the first hurdle
of being related to profit, but also because the contract holder's basis for
determining losses is not fully resolved. Gans & Soled, supra note 57, at 572.
Resolution of this issue may become more urgent if the current "tiny secondary
market" in annuity contracts grows. Opdyke, supra note 82, at B1.
98. 26 U.S.C. § 165(c)(2) (2000).
99. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 318 ("Losses on surrender of a life
insurance policy normally cannot be recognized for income tax purposes."). The
reasoning is that "any loss is assumed to be composed, in whole or in part, of...
mortality charges." Id.; see also Gans & Soled, supra note 57, at 574-76
(describing cases denying deductibility of losses for sold or surrendered life
insurance contracts). A couple of older cases allowed deduction of losses on
surrender of insurance contracts. See, e.g., Cohen v. Comm'r, 44 B.T.A. 709
(1941); Fleming v. Comm'r, 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 316 (1945). In both cases the life
insurance company through which the taxpayer originally purchased his life
insurance policy had been taken over by another company on account of
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subsequent discussion will assume that such deductions are
not permissible-although it seems likely that contract
holders who invested in hedge fund wrappers would also
take an aggressive position on the deductibility of losses on
surrender or sale of a variable life insurance contract.
A somewhat stronger case may be made for the
deductibility of net loss on surrender of a variable annuity
contract. 100 Again, the argument boils down to the assertion
that such contracts are entered into for profit rather than
for economic security' 0 1-which, of course, cuts against a
commonly cited justification for the tax deferral benefit
granted to annuities. The Code also provides that if an
annuitant dies after regular annuity payments begin, a loss
deduction is allowed on the decedent's final tax return in
the amount of the unrecovered investment in the
contract. 102
insolvency. The terms of the takeovers provided for a lien against the policy
reserves, which reduced each taxpayer's amount received on surrender of the
policy. In Cohen, the court held that the participating life insurance policy
purchased by Cohen constituted a transaction for profit. See Cohen 44 B.T.A. at
714. The facts of these cases, however, are unique and do not provide broad
support for a loss deduction on surrender of a variable life insurance contract.
But see Colvin, supra note 41, at 37 (citing these cases and arguing that because
of their investment orientation, losses on surrender of private placement
variable contracts may be deductible).
100. See Colvin, supra note 41, at 37 ("A loss on surrender of an investment
annuity is generally deductible as an ordinary ... loss.").
101. Revenue Ruling 61-201, 1961-2 C.B. 46, provides some support for
deductibility of losses. It held that an ordinary loss could be taken on surrender
of a refund annuity. See Rev. Rul. 61-201, 1961-2 C.B. 46. It also held that the
basis in the annuity contract was equal to the premiums paid less withdrawals
that had not been taxed. See id. at 47. Thus, the contract basis was not reduced
by any contract costs paid for with cash value. See id. This ruling warns:
"[n]othing in this ruling should be construed as permitting a loss deduction on
the surrender of any contract other than a refund annuity." Id.; see also Cohan
v. Comm'r, 11 B.T.A. 743, 759 (1928) (allowing a loss deduction for forfeited
premiums paid on an annuity contract determined to have been entered into
"for profit").
102. See 26 U.S.C. § 72(b)(3) (2000). In the case of variable annuities, this
Code provision may have limited application since variable annuities frequently
provide a minimum death benefit equal to the greater of the cash value or the
amount invested in the contract. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 175
(describing use in variable annuities of such a contractual provision);
Thompson, supra note 18, at 477-78 (describing the same). Before the
enactment of this Code section, Revenue Ruling 72-193, 1972-1 C.B. 58, had
held that loss treatment was not allowed on a decedent's return for a life
annuity that had terminated because the decedent's "primary purpose in
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In addition to income tax consequences, the estate tax
may also apply to variable insurance contract owners.103
The gross estate includes life insurance death benefits
either paid to the estate or the decedent possessed as
"incidents of ownership at death."'1 4 The value of annuity
payments are includible in the gross estate (to the extent
the decedent paid for the contract) if survivor benefits are
provided. 10 5 In addition to the specific Code provisions
governing life insurance and annuities, inclusion may be
required under other provisions-for example, the provision
requiring inclusion of proceeds if life insurance was
transferred within three years of death. 0 6 Whether the
amount of estate tax owed may be tied to the value of life
insurance or annuities included in the gross estate depends
on the complex interaction of various deduction and credit
provisions.107
The tax treatment of the insurance companies will also
affect contract owners, though an in-depth discussion of
company tax consequences is beyond the scope of this
Article. In the case of variable contracts, insurance
companies are generally exempt from explicit tax on the
returns generated by the investment funds underlying
variable contracts. 0 8 Thus, the returns arising from these
funds will likely be subject to, at most, only one nominal
level of tax.
entering into the contract was to provide security for himself, should he
continue to live," rather than to receive a profit.
103. The estate tax applies only to the wealthiest. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA,
supra note 4, at 52 (explaining that "the richest 2.3 percent of decedents" paid
this tax in 1999 and the exemption levels have increased since that time).
104. 26 U.S.C. § 2042 (2000); see BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 325-26.
105. See 26 U.S.C. § 2039 (2000); see also BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at
324.
106. See 26 U.S.C. § 2035 (2000); see also 26 U.S.C. § 2033 (inclusion of
property to the extent of decedent's interest); 26 U.S.C. § 2038 (inclusion of
property transferred but remaining subject to transferor control through
various retained powers).
107. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 326-32.
108. See 26 U.S.C. § 817(b) (2000); see also Richard W. Skillman, The Impact
of TEFRA and the 1984 Act on the "Inside Build-up" under Life Insurance
Products, 43 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 40-1, 40-41 (1985) (discussing this
provision).
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The effect of the tax provisions summarized above will
depend on the choices made by a variable contract holder
and the fees charged by the insurance company. In the case
of variable life insurance, for example, the result could be a
nominal zero rate on both gains and losses if no
withdrawals are made until death of the insured. For other
taxpayers, however, the fees and penalty taxes may make
variable contracts an altogether unsuitable investment. The
complex interaction of the tax provisions and the difficulty
of distinguishing the various tax components contribute to
the problem consumers have in receiving and making
adequate suitability determinations about these products.
C. Sheltering Techniques
The deferral of tax on the inside buildup of life
insurance and annuity contracts has seemingly created
incentives for individuals to lower their taxes by stuffing
these contracts with income streams that would otherwise
be taxed at higher rates. The primary focus of this Article is
on variable insurance, but an understanding of the reforms
introduced to curtail strategies focused on maximizing risk-
free returns is important to the question whether my
proposal could introduce new loopholes.
1. Low or No-risk Return Techniques. As described
above, a traditional cash value life insurance contract
guarantees a minimum interest rate payment actuarially
designed to ensure adequate funding of the death benefit. 109
In the case of deferred annuities, the company will also
guarantee a minimum return during the accumulation
phase. 110 A simple technique to enhance the tax benefit
derived from such minimum guarantees is to pay for a
contract with a single premium. This allows for the
maximum use of the inside buildup to fund the contract.
That is, rather than using post-tax funds to pay premiums,
through use of a single-premium contract, a taxpayer would
109. Even in the case of nonvariable cash value contracts, certain contracts
provide some risk-based return. See supra note 33.
110. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 170-71 (describing typical
guaranteed rates for deferred annuities).
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be able to fund the contract with a greater amount of pre-
tax accumulation."1
Two related techniques work only through life
insurance contracts. Under an endowment contract,
benefits are paid out not only on death but also if the
insured survives the term of the contract. 112 Setting the
endowment date earlier than the actuarially anticipated
death date permits a more investment-oriented contract. 1' 3
Another way to structure a more investment-oriented
contract is to provide a disproportionately small death
benefit. That is, the cash value could, under more
reasonable actuarial assumptions, support a much larger
death benefit than that provided for in the contract.
All three of these techniques have been dealt with to
some extent by Congress. As to annuities, in 1982 Congress
added the current rules on the tax treatment of loans and
withdrawals (including the penalty tax), which were
considered sufficient to deal with the problem of individuals
stuffing risk-free returns into these contracts." 4
Congress' approach to life insurance is more convoluted.
In order to combat the problem of a disproportionately large
cash value, the Code mandates a particular, actuarially
defined relationship between a life insurance contract's
cash value and its death benefit." 5 In order to test for this
111. See Vickrey, supra note 18, at 564 n.20 ("Single premium policies ...
have proven a fertile field for tax avoidance .... ").
112. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 3 ("[E]ndowment insurance pays
benefits if the insured dies during the policy term and also pays benefits if the
insured survives the policy term.").
113. Cf. id. at 88 (stating that even before 1984 law changes restricted
endowment insurance, "endowment insurance was having great difficulty
competing against whole life and term insurance").
114. See Joel H. Goldberg & Thomas P. Lemke, Disclosure of Variable
Annuity Tax Contingencies: Revenue Ruling 81-225 and the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 15 CONN. L. REV. 433, 450 (1983).
115. One of two tests must be met in order for a contract to qualify as life
insurance. I.R.C. § 7702 (2007). Several technical assumptions about interest
rates and mortality charges apply to both tests. The cash value accumulation
test was designed to accommodate traditional, level premium cash value
policies. Under this test, the amount of the cash surrender value can not exceed
the net single premium that would be required to fund future benefits under the
contract. Id. § 7702(b)(1). The second test was designed to accommodate flexible
premium contracts and consists of the guideline premium requirement and the
cash value corridor requirement. Under the guideline premium requirement,
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relationship, insurance companies must closely monitor
cash value amounts. Part of this test includes the
requirement that the contract endow no earlier than age
ninety-five, 116  which effectively ended the early-date
endowment contract technique. 117 Variable life insurance
contracts must also satisfy the death benefit/cash value
relationship requirements. Variable life insurance contracts
must be tested any time the death benefits change under
the contract but "not less frequently than once during each
twelve-month period."" 8
If a life insurance contract fails to satisfy the death
benefit/cash value relationship requirements, then the
income on the contract-including amounts used to pay for
insurance costs-is taxed at ordinary rates. 1 9 Prior years'
contract income is also taxed, even for years during which
the contract was in compliance. 20 Death benefits paid on
contracts failing the death benefit/cash value relationship
requirements are, however, excluded from income to the
extent they exceed the net surrender value of the
contract.' 2 '
the premiums paid may not exceed the greater of the guideline single premium
or the sum of the guideline level premiums. Id. § 7702(c). The guideline single
premium is the single premium that would be needed to fund the contract
under an assumed rate (greater of 6 percent or contractually guaranteed rate).
The guideline level premium is the sum of the level premiums needed to fund
the contract under minimum 4 percent interest rate. The cash value corridor
specifies that the death benefit must equal at least to certain multiple of the
cash value at a particular age. Id. §7702(d)(2); see also BLACK & SKIPPER, supra
note 8, at 313 (describing these two tests); Luke, supra note 2, at 168 & n.180;
Pike, supra note 18, at 509-17.
116. I.R.C. § 7702(e)(1)(B) (2007).
117. See Skillman, supra note 108, at 40-21.
118. I.R.C. § 7702(f)(9) (2007).
119. Id. § 7702(g)(1). The "income on the contract" means the excess of the
sum of the increase in the net surrender value plus the cost of life insurance
protection over the premiums paid. Id. § 7702(g)(1)(B). The cost of life insurance
protection is the lesser of the actual stated mortality charges or the costs
derived from Treasury regulations. Id. § 7702(g)(1)(D).
120. Id. § 7702(g)(1)(C). If failure occurs due to "reasonable error," the
insurance company may seek a waiver from the Treasury. Id. § 7702(f)(8). If a
waiver is granted, the company will be required to enter a closing agreement
and pay a "toll." Notice 99-48, 199-2 C.B. 429 (describing computation of
amounts to be paid under a closing agreement).
121. I.R.C. § 7702(g)(2) (2007).
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Even when a life insurance contract satisfies the death
benefit/cash value relationship requirements, if contract
premiums are excessively frontloaded (e.g., a single
premium contract), additional restrictions apply. Excessive
frontloading is determined under the "seven-pay test. ' 122 If
a contract fails this test, then the contract is termed a
"modified endowment contract" (MEC), and contract
payments and loans will be subject to essentially the same
rules that apply to annuities (including imposition of a ten
percent penalty for early withdrawals). 123 Distributions
made in the two years prior to the year in which the
contract fails the test are subject to these rules as well. 24
The complexity of these provisions illustrates the
lengths to which Congress has gone to preserve a tax
preference for inside buildup. Although the preference is
problematic, in the near future, Congress will doubtless
continue to provide some preference for insurance inside
buildup.
2. Wraparound Variable Insurance Shelters. By
wrapping an income-producing investment asset inside the
protective cloak of a variable insurance contract, contract
owners hope to convert a higher tax rate to a lower one.
This rate conversion technique was first used soon after
individual, commercial variable insurance became
available. 125 The earliest version of the shelter involved a
simple transfer of income-generating assets-e.g., dividend-
paying stock-inside an insurance contract.126 Later,
commercial mutual fund interests were wrapped inside
variable contracts. 127
In the most recently publicized wraparound tax shelter,
individuals used variable insurance contracts to lower their
122. The seven-pay test provides that the accumulated amount paid during
the first seven contract years may not exceed the sum of the net level premiums
that would have been paid had the contract been fully funded after the payment
of seven level annual premiums. Id. § 7702(b). Various complex computational
rules apply. Id. § 7702(c).
123. I.R.C. §§ 7702A, 72(e)(10), 72(v) (2007).
124. I.R.C. § 7702A(d) (2007).
125. See Luke, supra note 2, at 144-45.
126. See id. at 145-54.
127. See id. at 159-66.
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tax rate on hedge fund interests. 128 The tax treatment of
contract costs may also have contributed to the
attractiveness of this wraparound iteration. As described in
Part JI.B, hedge fund management fees paid for through
the contract cash value effectively receive "above-the-line"
treatment, whereas if they had been paid outright they
would have been subject to deductibility limitations. 129
Whether a wraparound shelter (or a plain vanilla
variable contract, for that matter) will be attractive to a
particular individual depends on multiple factors, including
the individual's marginal tax rate, the fees paid to the
insurance company/accommodation party, and the tax rate
on investments similar to those underlying the contract. 130
As will be described in Part III, the amount of tax savings
derived from tax rate differences may depend largely on the
rate applicable to the risk-free return component of the
investments. The wraparound shelter's appeal will also
depend on whether other tax shelters provide the same
results more cheaply. During the 1990s, for example,
individuals used derivatives to similar effect. Legislation
enacted in 1999 made the use of derivatives more costly
and, as a consequence, the use of variable contracts as
substitutes more alluring.131
Congress and the tax agencies have responded in
incremental fashion to the various iterations of this
shelter. 32 The following sections provide additional details
and analysis of these government reforms. The two primary
government responses-the investor control doctrine and
128. See id. at 174 (describing rise of hedge fund wrappers).
129. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
130. See Hershey, supra note 74 (explaining that low rate on dividends and
capital gains makes variable annuities "even less attractive").
131. I.R.C. § 1260 (2007); see also David M. Schizer, Frictions as a
Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1368 (2001) (describing
use of variable insurance as a substitute for derivatives following enactment of
§ 1260).
132. For additional history and analysis of the investor control doctrine and
the diversification requirement, see generally Luke, supra note 2. See also Carol
V. Calhoun, Tax Law and the Nonqualified Variable Annuity, 41 TAX LAW. 765
(1988); Gair Petrie, Eroding the Tax Benefits of Wrap-Around Annuities: An
Analysis of Revenue Ruling 81-225, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 95 (1981); Steven S.
Anreder, Attractive Wrapper: The Investment Annuity Has Begun to Catch On,
BARRON'S, Nov. 17, 1975, at 3.
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the diversification requirement-prohibit direct premium
allocation to publicly available investments and attempt to
make it more difficult to mimic such investments inside the
contract. Although appearances may have been smoothed
over by these reforms, even plain vanilla variable insurance
contracts can be described as wraparound contracts.
i. Investor Control Doctrine. The investor control
doctrine developed through a series of revenue rulings-the
first issued in 1977 and the most recent in 2003.133 The
doctrine, as it currently stands, operates principally by
forbidding contract holders from allocating premiums
directly to publicly available investments. 134 For example, a
contract holder may not allocate premiums directly to
Google shares-though it would be permissible to allocate
premiums to an investment fund holding Google shares, so
long as the interests in the fund were not publicly available.
The hedge fund wraparound shelter relied in part, on the
argument that the hedge fund interests were not publicly
available, because they were offered only to wealthy,
sophisticated investors and not publicly, as that term is
used in securities law. 135 The tax agencies cut off this
disingenuous argument relatively soon after reports of the
wraparound hedge funds began to circulate. 136
In addition to the bright-line prohibition against
allocating premiums directly to publicly available
investments, the investor control doctrine also contains a
substance-over-form standard. Investors are generally
prohibited from having too much control over what goes on
inside the funds underlying a variable insurance contract.
This "smell test" aspect of the investor control doctrine has
not been fully developed, although the idea of excessive
control leading to retention of ownership has been explored
in various trust and property cases. 137 Insurance companies
typically take into account this aspect of investor control by
133. See Luke, supra note 2, at 144-59, 174-83 (describing revenue ruling
series).
134. See id. at 165 (describing this rule, which was first fully implemented
in Rev. Rul. 81-225).
135. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-44-001 (May 2, 2002).
136. First they issued a private letter ruling, followed by a revenue ruling
and revised regulations. See Luke, supra note 2, at 176-79.
137. See id. at 190 (describing effect of this substance-over-form standard).
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restricting the number of allocation changes that can be
made in a particular year, 138 prohibiting contract owners
from paying premiums in kind, providing investment
choices that represent broad strategies, 139 and limiting
communication between the company and the contract
owner.140
ii. Diversification. Diversification is tested for on a
quarterly basis.' 4 ' Diversification is required of each
investment choice on the contract holder's menu for
premium allocations.142  Under the commonly used
regulatory test for diversification, any fund to which a
contract holder may directly make premium allocations
must hold at least five investments in the following
percentages: no more than fifty-five percent of the value in
any one investment, no more than seventy percent in two
investments, no more than eighty percent in three
investments, and no more than ninety percent in four
investments.143  Thus, this test does not mandate
diversification as it is generally understood in the financial
literature-i.e., the diversification away of nonmarket
risk. 144 Rather, the requirement is intended to make it more
difficult to mimic taxable cash flows inside the variable
contract.
As a result of the diversification requirement, a
contract owner may only choose from a menu of asset pools
and not from a menu of individual investment assets. Since
taxable investment pools (e.g., mutual funds) are now
widely available, the regulations clarify that menu choices
138. See id. at 163 & n.163.
139. See id. at 163-64, 180 n.234.
140. See Rachel Emma Silverman, "Private Placement" Policies Draw More
Wealthy Investors Despite Fees, Limited Control, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2006, at
D1 (explaining that tax rules require investors "to give up a good deal of control
and choice over.. . investments").
141. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(a)(1) (2004).
142. Each menu choice is more properly termed a "segregated asset
account." See Luke, supra note 2, at 171 (describing segregated asset accounts).
143. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(b)(1)(i) (2004).
144. Although five investments should help diversify away at least some
nonmarket risk. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 212 (6th ed. 2000). The type of risk that may be diversified
away is generally referred to as unsystematic risk or unique risk. See id. at 167.
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consisting of mutual funds, partnerships, and similar pass-
through entities will be tested for diversification by looking
through to their assets, but only so long as public access to
the entity is available only through purchase of a variable
contract. 145 For example, if one investment menu choice is
to allocate premiums to a partnership, the partnership
must be tested for diversification, and the test is performed
by seeing if the partnership holds at least five investment
assets in the required percentages. The partnership
interests must, however, be available only through variable
insurance contracts (or through certain other qualified
means). 146 Thus, the diversification test is, in part, also a
restatement of the investor control doctrine's prohibition on
public investments. 147
The diversification regulations amplify this restriction
by providing that certain holders will be disregarded for
purposes of testing whether an investment entity is
insurance-only. 148  Trustees of qualified pension or
retirement plans may hold interests, an exception which
considerably expands the available pool of qualified
holders. 149 Revenue Ruling 94-62 lists plans that qualify,
and it provides that the IRS may expand the list through
private letter ruling.150 The IRS has done so by adding, for
example, Roth IRAs, which were not yet created at the date
of the revenue ruling.151
iii. Discussion. As the law currently stands, whether a
particular product constitutes a "wraparound" tax shelter
rather than a permissible contract depends primarily on the
type of access taxpayers have to the underlying investment
145. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(f) (2006).
146. And to certain other qualifying persons-for example, qualified
retirement plans. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
147. Prior to a recent revision of this regulation, the "look-through" rule
applied to both private placement partnerships in addition to partnerships
whose interests were owned only through variable contracts (or by other
qualifying persons). This loophole was one of the arguments relied on in the
creation of the hedge fund wrapper. See Luke, supra note 2, at 172-73
(discussing this regulation and its use in the hedge fund wrapper).
148. See Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(f)(3) (2006).
149. See Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(f)(3)(iii) (2006).
150. Rev. Rul. 94-62, 1994-2 C.B. 164.
151. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-23-012 (June 5, 2002).
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assets. If taxpayers are able to access the underlying
investment only through a variable insurance contract (or
through the handful of other qualified means), then the
contract will not generally be considered a tax shelter. 52
This requirement is, however, largely formalistic. For
example, while it is not permissible to enclose a publicly
available hedge fund interest inside a variable contract, the
tax agencies have not attempted to use the investor control
doctrine to go after clones of publicly available hedge funds.
It is apparently permissible for an insurance company to
offer through variable contracts a copy of a publicly
available hedge fund interest. It just may not offer the
original, publicly available interest. 153  The primary
difficulty facing a taxpayer wishing to replicate taxable
investments will be to find an accommodating insurance
company, although the diversification requirement means
that a contract owner will have to be willing to wrap a
small pool of assets rather than a single asset.
After the government halts the use of a particular
investment type in variable contracts, the trend has been
for insurance companies to copy the investment, but restrict
who may be an investor. For example, after the tax agencies
prohibited the use of publicly available mutual fund
interests in variable contracts, companies turned to
creating mutual funds whose interests could only be
purchased through variable contracts. 154 Thus, today most
variable contracts are funded with insurance-only mutual
funds. A similar repackaging of hedge fund interests is
occurring.155 It is, thus, difficult-perhaps impossible-to
draw a principled distinction between an acceptable
variable contract and a wraparound tax shelter.
Such repackaging efforts may have the unintended
consequence of adding to the difficulty of providing
adequate suitability counseling to consumers deciding
152. See supra Part I.C.2.i (describing the substance-over-form aspect of the
investor control test).
153. See Silverman, supra note 140, at D1 (describing such contracts).
154. See Luke, supra 2, at 160-67.
155. See Colvin, supra note 41, at 36 (explaining that following the most
recent agency attack on hedge fund wraps, hedge funds have lost their
reluctance to "fully embrace" the market for insurance dedicated funds); see also
Silverman, supra note 140, at D1.
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whether to invest in these products. 156 As described above,
the investment funds underlying variable contracts must be
available only through insurance companies and certain
qualified retirement plans. 157 This may create an incentive
to engage in aggressive marketing techniques in order to
maximize the number and types of investment funds. A
related problem has been the improper selling of variable
insurance products by providing them as investment
choices for retirement plans that are already receiving tax
deferral benefits, such as IRAs. 158
My proposal would remove the need for the prohibition
on using taxable investments inside variable insurance
contracts. The tax diversification specific to variable
insurance contracts would not be required, although
separate tax diversification rules applicable to mutual
funds would apply.159 Since contract cash value would be
annually marked to market, protection against mimicking
taxable investments inside the contract would no longer be
necessary. The use of a broader array of underlying taxable
investments may help address problems of suitability to the
extent the current income tax system is allowing insurance
companies to control artificially the market in variable
contracts.
II. VARIABLE INSURANCE PROPOSAL
This section provides a detailed overview of my
proposal to tax risky returns on variable insurance 160 and
156. See Luke, supra note 2, at 190-91.
157. Two other narrower exceptions also apply. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(f)(3)(ii)
(2006) (interests may be held by manager if it was acquired "in connection with
the creation or management" of the fund); Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(f)(3)(iv) (2006)
(grandfather rule related to mutual fund wraparound contracts); see also Treas.
Reg. § 1.817-5(f)(3)(i) (2006) (insurance company general account may hold
interests but only if a segregated asset account also holds an interest and other
requirements are met).
158. See, e.g., Joseph B. Treaster, S.E.C. Plans Warning on Annuities, N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 2000, § 3, at 12 (describing lawsuits accusing annuity companies
of "inappropriately selling variable annuities to IRA and 401(k) investors").
159. See I.R.C. § 851(b) (2007).
160. Dividing investment returns into risk-free and risky components has
been utilized in incremental reform proposals aimed at alleviating the negative
effects of the realization requirement. One such proposal (which also reflects a
2832007]
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Domar-Musgrave approach, see infra Part III) is the retrospective taxation
method suggested by Professor Auerbach. Under retrospective taxation,
realization remains the trigger for tax payments. The tax owed at realization is
determined by taking the sales price at disposition and applying to it a formula
based on the taxpayer's marginal rates and the risk-free return rates during the
taxpayer's holding period. Auerbach, supra note 12, at 170-72. Because the tax
amount is not dependent on the length of the taxpayer's holding period or on
the asset's prior returns, Professor Auerbach's model is "holding-period
neutral." Id. at 169.
Initial purchase price (i.e., basis) does not need to be known. Rather, the
retrospective taxation model "treats investors as if they had arrived at their
current position by investing at the risk-free rate." Id. at 172. That is, the
process involves discounting the final sales price back using the risk-free rate
rather than bringing the initial sales price forward through imputing interest.
Tax is imposed on this gain, and the taxpayer is also required to pay interest on
the gains that accrued in earlier periods. Because value is not measured during
the holding period, use of the initial purchase price could fail to alleviate lock-in
problems if the value of the asset grew faster than the risk-free rate. Id. at 173.
This occurs because the rate of return would be calculated on too low a base. Id.
For example, suppose an investor purchases an asset for $100 at the beginning
of Year 1. Assume that the imputed interest rate is a constant 5 percent but
that the asset has increased in value to $110 at the end of Year 1. If interest is
imputed based only on initial sales price and without reliance on any
subsequent valuation, the base for Year 2's calculation would be $105 ($100 +
$5 imputed interest) rather than $110. If the investor is trying to decide
whether to hold or sell this asset at the end of Year 1, she will consider that if
she sells for $110 and reinvests the $110 in a new asset, the risk-free return
would be imputed on $110 for Year 2 rather than the lower $105 if she does not
sell and reinvest.
Although Professor Auerbach's proposal applies to final sales price, it is not an
ex post system. Id. at 176. The formula takes an ex ante approach by assuming
that the asset earned the risk-free return during the taxpayer's holding period.
Actual growth in value could differ significantly from the risk-free rate, raising
fairness concerns. See Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation,
Sectoral Accretionism, and The Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV.
861, 943-44 (1998) (critiquing Auerbach's approach). For example, disposition of
an asset would be taxed the same whether the sales price accrued slowly over
time or in one rapid burst. A similar criticism could, however, be made of ex post
wealth taxes. Auerbach, supra note 12, at 176. In addition, the final sales price
could result in a loss but the individual would still have to pay taxes at sale. Id.
Thus, no ex post adjustment is made, and only the risk-free returns deemed
earned are taxed. If application of the Domar-Musgrave theory is assumed,
fairness concerns raised by this ex ante approach evaporate since the ideal,
proportional income tax does not reach ex post risk-based returns. See Noel B.
Cunningham, Observations on Retrospective Taxation, 53 TAX L. REV. 489, 491
(2000) ("[T]he tax burden imposed under the Auerbach approach is precisely the
same as that of a conventional normative income tax.").
Professors Cunningham and Schenk have also suggested a proposal making use
of a deemed risk-free return (it is not as closely tied to Domar-Musgrave
because of the way ex post adjustments are carried out, see infra Part III.A).
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discusses potential objections to the proposal-other than
those directly related to Domar-Musgrave. 161
A. Proposal Details
Under my proposal, the risk-free rate is applied to the
beginning-of-period cash value. 16 2 At the end of each tax
period, the insurance contract cash value is marked to
Professors Cunningham and Schenk have recommended that commercial
investments yielding low or no current tax be deemed to earn a minimum
return equal to the rate on Treasury securities. Cunningham & Schenk, supra
note 18, at 727, 735. The minimum return is applied to basis each year, and
basis is increased by the amount included in income. Id. at 735-36. Applying the
minimum return to basis eliminates the need for regular valuations. When the
investment is sold, gain or loss is calculated according to the basis that has been
adjusted for the minimum return income inclusions. Id. at 736. Thus, although
tax is imposed each year based on expected returns, reconciliation of actual and
expected returns occurs on the sale of the asset. Id. at 736.
Professors Cunningham and Schenk assert that this expected value approach
moves the taxation of investments closer to the result under Haig-Simons
without the burdensome valuations required by a full mark-to-market system.
Id. at 748. By taxing a deemed minimum return, arbitrage caused by
realization rule deferral loses some of its attractiveness. Id. at 749.
For a critique of the Cunningham-Schenk proposal, see Zelinsky, supra, note 60
at 927-31. He argues that the Cunningham-Schenk proposal "does not eliminate
distortions but merely trades realization-generated distortions for a different
set of inefficiencies." Id. at 930.
161. See infra Part III.C for discussion regarding the use of Domar-
Musgrave in crafting incremental reform.
162. Adjustment for changes in the risk-free rate during the tax period could
be made. As described infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text, I propose
using the rate on short-term Treasury debt as the risk-free rate.
Applying the risk-free rate to opening cash value contrasts with Professor
Auerbach's method of discounting back. See supra note 160. I assume that
Congress (and taxpayers) would want the minimum return deduction to be as
large as possible. If cash value has increased during the year, the preference
would be to use Professor Auerbach's discounting system. On the other hand, if
cash value has declined during the year, the preference would be to use opening
cash value. Some imprecision is inevitable, and use of opening cash value was
chosen because it is likely the more intuitive approach for taxpayers.
My proposal also shares similarities with the Cunningham-Schenk proposal in
which the risk-free rate is applied to basis and carried forward. See id. All of the
investment returns are eventually taxed under my proposal (unless no
withdrawals are made under a life insurance contract prior to death). Because
of this aspect of my proposal, investment in the contract must be tracked, just
as basis was required to be maintained under the Cunningham-Schenk
proposal. See id.
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market, and it is assumed that the resulting net economic
gain or loss is composed of both the deemed risk-free return
and a risk-based return. That is, if there is a gain, a portion
of the gain is characterized as the risk-free return; the
remainder of the gain is deemed the risk-based return. If
the mark-to-market procedure yields a loss, it is assumed
that but for the deemed risk-free return earned on the
beginning cash value, the loss would have been greater. 163
As a result, the deemed risk-based loss will be larger than
the net economic loss.
The deemed risk-free return is offset by a deduction,
which I term the "minimum return deduction." In order to
provide a result similar to that of nonvariable cash value
contracts, this deduction should result in deferral of tax on
the accumulated risk-free returns. Permanent exclusion
should result only if withdrawal from a life insurance
contract is not made until death of the insured. Thus,
adjustments are made to the investment in the contract to
ensure that withdrawals will trigger proper tax
treatment. 164 In order to preserve the benefits of tax
deferral, interest is not charged on the risk-free returns
deemed accumulated during tax periods prior to a taxable
withdrawal from the variable contract.
1. Examples. The following examples assume a year-
long tax period, no contract expenses and a constant risk-
free rate of return of five percent
Year 1: At the beginning of Year 1, Judy invests $100 in
a variable life insurance contract. At the end of the year,
the cash value increased to $120. The contract is marked to
market, yielding a $20 economic gain. Five dollars of this
gain will be deemed to be the risk-free return on the
original $100 investment. 165 The $15 remainder is deemed
the risk-based gain for the year. Judy receives a minimum
163. See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 172 (describing how it is possible for a
person to lose money but still be deemed to have earned the risk-free rate);
Weisbach, supra note 11, at 13-14 (illustrating that in loss year the economic
amount reflects netting of risk-based loss with risk-free return).
164. A related question is whether the current beneficial treatment of
withdrawals from life insurance should be maintained. See supra Part I.B. This





return deduction in the amount of $5, which will offset the
risk-free return inclusion. Judy's investment in the contract
increases from $100 to $115 to reflect her net tax
consequences. 16 6 This adjustment ensures that tax on the
risk-free return is deferred, rather than excluded. For
example, if she were to terminate the contract at the
beginning of Year 2 and withdraw the $120 cash value, she
would be taxed on $5.
Year 2: At the end of Year 2, the cash value declines to
$110. When her contract is marked to market, Judy has a
$10 economic loss, but she also is deemed to have earned a
$6 risk-free return on her $120 beginning-of-year cash
value. In order to arrive at a $10 economic loss, Judy is
deemed to have experienced a $16 risk-based loss. She will
recognize this $16 risk-based loss for the tax year. Judy will
also receive a $6 minimum return deduction, offsetting the
deemed $6 of risk-free return. Judy's investment in the
contract will be $99.167 Once again, this preserves the
potential for tax on the risk-free return. If Judy terminates
the contract at the beginning of Year 3 and withdraws the
$110 value, she would be taxed on $11, the sum of the
minimum return deductions from Years 1 and 2.
Year 3: At the end of Year 3, the cash value has
declined to $10. When her contract is marked to market,
Judy has a $100 economic loss, but she also is deemed to
have earned a $5.50 risk-free return on her $110 beginning-
of-year cash value. In order to arrive at a $100 economic
loss, Judy is deemed to have experienced a $105.50 risk-
based loss. She will recognize this risk-based loss for the tax
year. Judy will also receive a $5.50 minimum return
deduction, which will offset the deemed $5.50 of risk-free
return. Judy's investment in the contract will be a negative
$6.50.168 The use of a negative investment in the contract
preserves the potential for tax on the risk-free return. If
Judy were to terminate the contract at the beginning of
Year 4 and withdraw the $10 value, she would be taxed on
166. $100 original investment, plus $15 risk-based gain, plus $5 risk-free
return, minus $5 minimum return deduction.
167. $115 Year 1 investment in the contract, minus $16 risk-based loss, plus
$6 riskless rate of return, minus $6 minimum return deduction.
168. $99 Year 2 investment in the contract, minus $105.50 risk-based loss,
plus $5.50 riskless rate of return, minus $5.50 minimum return deduction.
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$16.50, which is equal to the sum of the minimum return
deductions from Years 1, 2, and 3.
The use of negative investment in the contract is
unorthodox and creates a lock-in effect. Although
encouraging individuals to stay invested in cash value
insurance is at the heart of the tax incentive, at some point
individuals-assuming an accommodating insurance
company-could hold onto worthless contracts in order to
avoid the tax. As a result, it may be necessary to create a
deemed realization event if the cash value of a contract falls
to a worthless or near-worthless level.
2. Effect of Insurance Costs. The above examples did not
incorporate insurance contract costs and fees. In order to
provide parity with the current tax treatment of cash value
insurance contracts, a cost payment would need to carry
with it a current deduction if paid for from the variable
contract cash value. 169 The most straightforward way of
carrying this out is to provide a current deduction for such
costs.
The timing of the reduction of cash value for payment of
fees will affect the base used for calculating risk-free
return. While it would be possible to calculate the risk-free
return to track precisely change in the base caused by
contract cost payment, an administratively simpler solution
is to deem all contract costs paid at the same time. For
example, the costs would reduce cash value from the
beginning of the tax period regardless of when cash value
was actually reduced during the tax period. Alternatively,
the contract costs could all be deemed paid after both the
risk-free and risk-related returns are determined for the
current tax period, leading to a larger base for purposes of
calculating the risk-free return.
I propose calculating the return components before
taking into account the costs. Premiums are priced to take
into account the returns they will generate. For example, a
term life insurance premium is likely discounted to reflect
the income that will accrue during the year on the premium
even though term life is generally referred to as having no
169. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
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cash value. 170 Thus, returning to the Year 1 example above,
if there had been $1 of insurance costs paid in Year 1 from
the cash value, the amount of the risk-related return ($15)
and the risk-free return ($5) would remain unchanged.
Judy would also receive a $1 deduction for her insurance
costs. Her investment in the contract would be reduced
from $115 to $114, and in Year 2, the five percent assumed
riskless rate of return would be applied to a $119 cash
value rather than $120. This method would preserve
deferral rather than exclusion of the minimum return
deduction. If Judy were to withdraw all her cash value at
the beginning of Year 2, she would be taxed on $5, which
equals the amount of her Year 1 minimum return
deduction.1 71
Under current law, to the extent cash value
withdrawals are taxable, they are taxed at ordinary income
rates. 172 Returns derived from the types of funds underlying
a variable contract would, however, frequently be treated as
capital gains or losses, which may be short-term or long-
term, and subject to netting requirements and loss
170. See Pike, supra note 18, at 497-98 (describing how term insurance
pricing likely reflects an interest component).
171. The provision of a current deduction for expenses paid from cash value
may, however, appear unseemly even though it is essentially what is already
offered under cash value insurance contracts. In addition, as discussed in Part
I.B, to the extent the expenses relate to investment management, they would be
deductible as miscellaneous itemized deductions (or netted from investment
return in the case of publicly-offered mutual funds). It may, however, be
politically desirable to make the deduction less transparent, in which case a
similar (though not identical) result could be obtained by providing no expense
deduction but by increasing the investment in the contract by the amount of the
expenses paid from cash value. Ultimately, this would allow the taxpayer to
offset future gains on withdrawal, but the timing would be less advantageous
than with a simple current deduction.
A better result would be for Congress to revisit the issue of paying mortality
expenses with cash value. If out-of-pocket mortality charge payments are not
deductible, then no implicit deduction should be available if payment is made
with the cash value. A relatively simple way to deny even an implicit deduction
for mortality charges is to treat charges paid through cash value as a deemed
withdrawal of cash from the contract followed by the use of that cash to pay the
expenses. Whether the deemed withdrawal were taxable would depend on
application of I.R.C. § 72.
172. Regular annuity payments are also treated as ordinary income to the
extent they are taxable under an exclusion ratio. I.R.C. § 72(b) (2007).
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limitation rules. 173 Such restrictions are departures from a
normative income tax.174 In a mark-to-market system, loss
limitation rules are unnecessary since they are required to
prevent taxpayers from engaging in selective realization to
take losses when most beneficial for tax purposes (i.e.,
"cherry-picking"). 175 The possibility of a loss-stuffing shelter
is, however, considered in the next section.
B. Potential Objections
Use of a mark-to-market system brings with it concerns
about valuation and liquidity. There may also be questions
raised about whether my proposal creates new distortions
between the treatment of variable insurance and
nonvariable cash value or between variable insurance and
other taxable investments. New sheltering possibilities
must also be considered.
1. Valuation and Liquidity. Valuation and liquidity are
two well-recognized obstacles to a mark-to-market tax
system.176 Regular valuation of contract cash value should
not, however, present a problem since insurance companies
must be able to provide information to contract owners
about available cash value. In the case of life insurance,
tracking cash value is already mandatory under the
Code. 177 While the Code does not directly mandate
calculation of annuity cash values, they must be calculated
for purposes of determining tax owed on withdrawals. In
173. Net short-term gains are taxed at the same rates as ordinary income,
while net capital gain is taxed a special rate. I.R.C. § 1(h) (2007). For
individuals, capital losses are deductible only to the extent of capital gains plus
a modest $3000 per year additional deduction. Id. § 1211(b).
174. And thus also hamper Domar-Musgrave effects. See infra Part III.
175. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 287 (explaining that "full
deductibility of capital losses is not feasible" given the realization requirement
"because investors with diversified portfolios could 'cherry-pick' their assets").
In order to facilitate Domar-Musgrave effects, losses arising out of a variable
contract should not only be currently deductible but should be refundable. See
infra Part III.
176. David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual
Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1118 (1986) (describing the "two major
obstacles to accrual taxation" as valuation and liquidity problems).
177. I.R.C. § 7702 (2007).
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addition, for both types of contracts, contractual loan limits
and surrender charges may be tied to cash value.
While valuation should not present a problem if the
types of assets underlying variable contracts remain as they
are now, the mark-to-market system I propose does raise
the possibility that individuals will attempt to understate
the cash value amount (although this would affect the
minimum return deduction amount). In addition, if
difficult-to-value assets are placed inside variable contracts,
valuation would be more costly. Accommodation for these
types of assets should not be made, and valuation would be
required. The problem seems unlikely to arise since
variable insurance would seem to be an odd vehicle for
holding artwork, for example, since the realization rule
would already provide deferral.
Several factors should alleviate concerns about
taxpayer liquidity. The individuals investing in variable
insurance are likely to be relatively well off (although for
many such contracts may still not be suitable). Further, the
minimum return deduction will help lower the amount of
gains that are taxable in a particular year. In the case of
cash value life insurance loans are easily obtained and have
no tax consequences. While loans taken against annuity
cash values do not provide this same opportunity, if
concerns about liquidity are substantial the penalty tax
could be abated for withdrawals used to pay taxes.
2. Fairness Concerns. Since under my proposal cash
value is marked-to-market annually, imprecision relating to
the size of the base for imputation of the risk-free return is
fairly minimal. 178 Critics might, however, assert that my
proposal does not provide adequate parity of treatment
between nonvariable, cash value insurance contracts, and
variable contracts. Short-term Treasury debt would be used
to calculate a tax period's risk-free return. This rate will be
greater than mere passage-of-time return, estimated to be
178. The mark-to-market period could be shortened to less than one year.
Administrative costs would be increased but would remain comparable to
similar rate resets already undertaken by insurance companies. For example,
some interest-sensitive, nonvariable insurance contracts provide rate resets as
frequently as monthly. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 117 (describing




only .7% between 1926 and 2004.179 The remainder of the
return on short-term Treasury debt reflects inflationary
expectations.18 0 Thus, even though the tax system as a
whole is not adjusted for inflation, using short-term
Treasury debt for the risk-free rate provides some
protection against being taxed on inflationary gains.' 8 '
Inflationary returns should not be taxed since they do not
represent real income. 8 2
Under nonvariable cash value contracts, the insurance
company, and not the contract holders, bears the
investment risk. As a result, the rate guaranteed by the
company will be conservative and will generally reflect the
rate available on no- or low-risk investments. 183 While the
guaranteed rates may be low, more modern, nonvariable
contracts may provide for the possibility of larger,
contingent returns. For example, rates may be ratcheted up
or down (though not below the floor of the guaranteed rate)
based on a specific index, including some contracts that are
keyed to short-term T-bills.18 4
Insurance companies are well aware that they may lose
business during periods of higher interest rates, 8 5 and
179. See Zelenak, supra note 10, at 880; see also Bankman & Griffith, supra
note 18, at 387 (explaining that study methodology was to compare the return
on short-term treasury bills with period inflation rates and averaging the
results). However, "the current risk-free rate of return is clearly higher than the
near-zero level indicated by much of the historical data," and may be less trivial
than it is perceived by many experts. See Zelenak, supra note 10, at 889-90.
180. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 64 ("[I]nflation expectations
drive interest rates"). Thus, use of short-term Treasury debt as the appropriate
risk-free return benchmark assumes that its returns do not reflect a significant
risky component.
181. Auerbach, supra note 12, at 169 n.2 ("If the tax system is not indexed
for inflation, then this rate [the risk-free interest rate] should be viewed as a
nominal interest rate."); Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 18, at 735 (using
Treasury bill rate as the risk-free return).
182. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 18, at 391 ("Virtually all scholars
on both sides of the income and consumption tax debate believe that return
attributable to inflation should not be taxed."); Weisbach, supra note 11, at 30-
32.
183. See supra note 33.
184. See id.
185. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 8, at 64 (describing how contract
holders exit traditional life insurance during periods of high interest rates).
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contract innovation is driven in part by such concerns. 86
Even if a contract does not offer rate adjustments, contract
holders have the option to exchange, tax-free, their old
contracts for new contracts offering competitive rates. 8 7
Thus, the proposed risk-free rate (short-term Treasury
debt) will be lower than the rate offered by some contracts,
and it will be higher than that offered by others. 8 8 While it
would be possible to use a deemed return tied to actual
contract returns, such a system would be more costly to
administer. In addition, some compromises would still have
to be made given the wide variety of nonvariable insurance
contracts. 8 9
In addition to concern about the similarity of tax
treatment between variable and nonvariable insurance
products, my proposal may elicit the contention that
contract owners would be taxed more heavily than they
would be if they held the underlying investments directly
and purchased nonvariable cash value insurance. It would
be possible to use a pass-through system rather than the
proposed mark-to-market approach. That is, the contract
owner's current taxation could be based on a share of the
tax items generated by the various investment units
underlying the variable contract cash value.
Although tax information for such investments should
be available in most cases (since underlying investment
funds are generally treated as separate tax entities), the
process for passing through the various tax components to
the contract holders would introduce significant
administrative complexity. In addition, some of the
underlying investments would already be providing some
deferral of tax on the risk-free return through operation of
the realization requirement. Thus, it would be problematic
to provide a minimum return deduction based on cash value
186. For example, variable contracts were created in order to provide an
insurance product that would keep pace with general market trends. See Luke,
supra note 2, at 134-35.
187. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
188. Actual interest credited does not need to match the assumed rates used
under § 7702 in the cash value accumulation test or guideline premium test
assumed rates. See Pike, supra note 18, at 511-14.
189. Further, given the implications of Domar-Musgrave, deferral of tax on
the risk-free component of both variable and nonvariable contracts may provide
parity of treatment between the two types of contracts. See infra Part III.
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while taxing other contract returns based on a pass-through
regime. 190
3. New Tax Shelters. New tax sheltering opportunities
frequently arise from the ashes of an old shelter. Provision
of a specific minimum return deduction could induce
individuals to artificially maximize the base on which this
deduction is calculated. The threat should not, however, be
greater than that already posed by existing cash value
contracts, which are governed by Code sections designed to
prevent this technique. 191 While these provisions could be
fine-tuned, the larger question is whether the tax deferral
for inside buildup should continue at all. The answer is
likely that it should not, 192 but as discussed throughout, the
tax treatment for inside buildup is so firmly-entrenched
that reform efforts must work around it.
Because my proposal allows for current deduction of
risk-related losses, taxpayers may attempt to increase these
losses artificially. Losses on investments owned outside the
variable contract are generally subject to deductibility
limitations, whereas under a mark-to-market system losses
are generally fully allowed and at ordinary tax rates. If a
taxpayer knows that an investment will produce a loss, the
taxpayer would prefer a high tax rate. Thus, taxpayers
would have some incentive to shift investments inside
variable contracts once it was certain they would produce a
loss that would otherwise be subject to limitations. 193 The
more subjective standard of the investor control doctrine
could be retained in order to prevent this type of ex post
manipulation of tax rates. 194
190. The Domar-Musgrave theory suggests that contract owners will be
better off under a mark-to-market system because it would allow them to make
portfolio adjustments more efficiently. See infra Part III.C.
191. See supra Part I.B (describing provisions mandating a particular
relationship between cash value and death benefit, providing for early
withdrawal penalties, and restricting excessive front-loading).
192. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
193. See Schizer, supra note 12, at 1911 (describing problem of "ex post
reclassification" by taxpayers wishing to "pretend" a different transaction
occurred once results are known).
194. See supra Part I.C.2.i.
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In addition to the incentive to shift bona fide
investments once it is known that they will produce losses,
taxpayers may also have some incentive to craft underlying
assets that are virtually certain to produce losses. One
hallmark, however, of a loss generator shelter is that the
economic risk of loss is essentially nonexistent. 195 Keying
the amount of loss to the actual decline in value of a
contract's cash value should help minimize this type of
shelter. While an especially accommodating insurance
company might be willing to tolerate negative cash value in
the interest of enlarging the current loss deductions of a
wealthy client, negative cash value could easily be
prohibited and, as described above, a persistent low or zero
cash value would also trigger taxation of the deferred risk-
free returns. 196
III. DOMAR-MUSGRAVE CONSIDERATIONS
Numerous reform proposals have addressed the
questions of whether and how to replicate, with its
accompanying current taxation of net gains and deduction
of net losses, the annual asset valuation required by the
Haig-Simons income norm.197  A possible, though
195. See Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1939, 1939 (2005) (describing tax shelters whose aim "is to create a tax benefit
in the form of a loss . . . that has no economic corollary but is simply the
consequence, or the hoped-for consequence, of rule manipulation").
196. See supra Part II.A.
197. Under the Haig-Simons income ideal, assets would be valued at the
end of each tax period so that the net increase (or decrease) in wealth could be
measured accurately and subjected to current taxation-a mark-to-market
approach. The realization requirement interferes with the accomplishment of
this ideal since the tax consequences of holding an asset are put off until its
disposition (or other realization event). See generally Deborah H. Schenk, A
Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57 TAx L. REV. 355 (2004) (evaluating
consensus views on realization requirement, including discussion of valuation,
liquidity, and accrual taxation). The principal negative consequences of this
deviation from an ideal income tax are lock-in effects and tax-avoidance
transactions. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 286 (3d ed. 2004)
(describing these two effects); Auerbach, supra note 12, at 167-68 (same); see
also David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549, 1552
(1998) (article exploring whether realization can be justified as a "subsidy for
private savings and investment"); Zelinsky, supra note 160, at 862 (1997)
(concluding that "choosing de novo, we should elect realization, not
accretionism, as a fundamental premise upon which to construct an income
tax").
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controversial, implication of the taxation-and-risk literature
is that, with respect to risk-related returns, these questions
may be largely beside the point. 198 Below is a brief synopsis
of Domar-Musgrave, followed by an overview of its
application given the current tax system. This Part
concludes with a short discussion of the question as to how
Domar-Musgrave should be taken into account in designing
incremental tax reform and how it applies with respect to
my variable insurance reform proposal.
A. Overview
The taxation and risk literature theorizes that under an
ideal, single-rate income tax a taxpayer can and will
achieve the same risk position in the after-tax world as in
the no-tax world by making portfolio adjustments,
assuming that (1) increasing the size of an investment is
costless (including no change to price and yield)199 and (2)
gains and losses from an asset are taxed at the same rate
(including a refundability feature to ensure full
deductibility of losses). 200
198. For examples of or discussions about this literature, see Bankman &
Griffith, supra note 18, at 392-403; Terrence R. Chorvat, Apologia for the
Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 242-43
(2003) (applying Domar-Musgrave analysis to the corporate double tax);
Cunningham, supra note 10; Domar & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 390; Louis
Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium Perspective, 47
NAT'L TAX J. 789 (Dec. 1994); Lederman, supra note 91, at 1435-43 (using
Domar-Musgrave to analyze the tax burden on entrepreneurs); Jan Mossin,
Taxation and Risk-Taking: An Expected Utility Approach, 35 ECONOMICA 74
(1968); Schizer, supra note 12; J.E. Stiglitz, The Effects of Income, Wealth, and
Capital Gains Taxation on Risk-Taking, 83 Q. J. ECON. 263 (1969); Weisbach,
supra note 11.
199. See Schizer, supra note 12, at 1903-04 (explaining that increased
demand could increase costs, which "could prevent taxpayers from completely
canceling out the tax").
200. Domar & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 422 (explaining that different
rates for gains and losses caused by a progressive tax system would alter their
conclusions); see also Schizer, supra note 12, at 1891. Schizer describes the two
principal assumptions as: "First, the government's share of gains must match
its share of losses. Second, taxpayers must be able to adjust the size of their
risky bets costlessly." Id.
Additional assumptions must be made. These relate to market conditions,
investor expectations and wealth. See Domar & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 393,
421-22.
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That a normative income tax does not reach risky
returns follows from the insight that tax rates affect not
only investment yield but also the riskiness of an
investment.20 1 If losses are deductible at the same rate at
which income is taxed and are refundable, then the tax
system affects yield and risk by the same amount such that
"the return per unit of risk-taking remains unchanged. ''20 2
As a result, a taxpayer can increase the size of his
investment to attain the risk-based returns he would have
had in the absence of taxes. If it costs nothing to increase
his position, the taxpayer will rationally make
adjustments. 203
To take a simple example, taxpayer Trevor wishes to
make a bet on the flip of a $1 coin, which he owns. If he
wins, he receives back his $1 coin and wins an additional
$1. If he loses, he forfeits his coin. In the no-tax world,
Trevor would have a $1 gain if he wins and a $1 loss if not.
If a fifty percent tax rate applied equally to gains and
losses-without any limitation on loss deductibility-Trevor
would have $ .50 after-taxes if he won and would lose $ .50
after taxes if not. By doubling the bet, Trevor could get back
to the same position he would have had in the no-tax world,
and he borrows $1 to make this adjustment. After paying
back the loan, he will have a net gain of $1 if he wins and a
net loss of $1 if not, which matches the returns available in
the no-tax world.
Thus, if the tax system provides full loss offsets, the
government will have no additional tax revenue from
nominally taxing risk-based returns.20 4  Instead, the
government is using the tax system to take an indirect
position in the risk-based returns market 205 and will share
201. See Domar & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 389.
202. Id.
203. See Weisbach, supra note 11, at 8 (explaining that individuals "can and
will adjust their portfolios" to offset the effect of the tax imposed on risk-based
returns). An individual's precise response will be "a function of her utility
schedule." Bankman & Griffith, supra note 18, at 395. The adjustment,
however, should tend toward increasing the riskiness of the portfolio. Id. at 395.
204. See Weisbach, supra note 11, at 10 ("No tax revenue is collected and no
risk is shifted. The tax is a complete nullity.").
205. While the government's share of any positive expected return may look
like tax, it is not. Instead, the share represents the government's share of the
risk premium and has a zero value. See Schizer, supra note 12, at 1932-33
2007] 297
298 BUFFALO LAWRETVIEW [Vol. 55
in the taxpayer's investment gains and losses.20 6 Like the
taxpayer, the government can adjust its portfolio in order to
arrive at its desired risk position. 207
B. Real World Domar-Musgrave
Two controversial questions are, first, to what extent do
Domar-Musgrave effects occur in the real world under the
current tax system, and second, how, if at all, should
Domar-Musgrave be used to inform tax reform. 20 8 Though
empirical evidence remains unclear, 209 the current tax
system likely reaches some risky returns, though in a
manner that may be arbitrary and even regressive. 210 First,
the income tax imposes various loss limitation rules. Under
(explaining why the government's share of the risk premium has zero value and
looks "a lot like a direct government investment in a portfolio"); Weisbach,
supra note 11, at 12.
206. See Domar & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 390 (noting that "the
Treasury assumes part of the risk... [i]f losses can be [fully] offset").
207. See Weisbach, supra note 11, at 9-10; Zelenak, supra note 10, at 884
n.18.
208. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 18, at 405 ("It is unclear whether
an income tax without full loss offsets will increase or decrease the amount of
risky assets."); Lederman, supra note 91, at 1444 (arguing that given the loss
deductibility restrictions on investments, "it is unrealistic to think that
individuals functionally can eliminate the tax burden on investment capital
through portfolio shifts"); Schenk, supra note 197, at 390-91 (explaining reasons
for believing that the Domar-Musgrave model may not apply to the current
income tax); Zelenak, supra note 10, at 891-96 (discussing the extent to which
risky returns may be taxed under the current system).
Relatively few proposals have been made that explicitly take into account
Domar-Musgrave effects-largely owing to this controversy over its application
in the real world. One key proposal that is consistent with the Domar-Musgrave
framework is the retrospective taxation method described by Professor
Auerbach. See Auerbach, supra note 160; see also Bradford, supra note 12, at
738 (describing a similar method and stating the "Auerbach method is a special
case of the alternative approach"); Weisbach, supra note 11, at 12-15
(decomposing the returns on stock investment into a risk-based and riskless
portion in order to illustrate the taxation-and-risk model).
209. See Weisbach, supra note 11, at 45 ("The empirical evidence is
insufficient to sway us one way or another.").
210. See Cunningham, supra note 10, at 21-22 (discussing how a normative
income tax is "probably somewhat regressive" and also burdens the
unsophisticated); Schenk, supra note 10, at 424 ("It [an income tax] is only able
to tax the return to risk realized by poor and unsophisticated taxpayers or by
varying a normative income tax in arbitrary and unacceptable ways.").
TAXING RISK
Domar-Musgrave, if losses may never be deducted but
income is still taxed, then the tax system changes the
investment yield but not the riskiness of an asset. 211 As a
result, if a taxpayer wants to regain her pre-tax income
position, she would have to increase her investment and
thereby take more risk.212 But because the tax system will
also cause a reduction in the return per unit of risk, there is
less inducement to take risk. The taxpayer may instead
reduce her level of investment in order to reduce risk.213
Tax reality, of course, falls between the position of full
loss deductibility and no loss deductibility. 214 For certain
privileged taxpayers, however, the tax system looks more
like a full loss offset system than it does for other taxpayer
groups. Carryforward provisions apply to unused capital
losses, for example. 21 5 Further, the realization rule provides
taxpayers-particularly sophisticated ones-the ability to
time recognition of gains and losses so as to minimize any
impact from loss limitation rules. That is, loss deductibility
restrictions may actually serve to equalize tax rates on
gains and losses because of the deferral benefits afforded
gains.216 Wealthy individuals are likely in the best position
to use this "timing option. '' 217
211. See Domar & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 389.
212. See id. at 390. This is an income effect analogous to the idea that an
increase in the tax rate on wages puts pressure on workers to increase labor in
order to stay at the same level of income they enjoyed prior to the tax change.
213. See id. Again, by analogy to the labor market, an increase in the tax
rate on wages may induce workers to substitute leisure for labor since the
return on labor has been diminished by the tax. See id. at 405-06 (analogizing
the substitution and income effects at work to those also present in the labor
market).
214. See Weisbach, supra note 11, at 33-34 (discussing various distortions in
the income tax system); Zelenak, supra note 10, at 892-93 (discussing various
limitations on loss offsets in the current tax system).
215. Domar & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 391 (describing "limited
provisions for loss offset in the tax law").
216. David A. Weisbach, Taxation and Risk-Taking with Multiple Tax
Rates, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 229, 241 (2004).
217. See Schizer, supra note 12, at 1909-10 (describing the timing option);
see also Domar & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 391 ("A large corporation or a
large-scale financial investor may undertake a risky investment as a side line,
and know that possible losses are covered by other income which is reasonably
certain to be derived from the main line of business.").
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In addition to restrictions on loss deductibility, which
may affect whether gains and losses from the same asset
type are taxed at the same rate, the current income tax
system provides for different rates on different asset types.
Professor Weisbach argues that differential tax rates across
asset types do not affect risk-taxing.2 1 Instead, the benefit
or detriment resulting from selecting among investments to
which different tax rates apply would arise solely from the
risk-free return component.2 19 As a result, this tax benefit
or detriment would likely be small, with the result that
deadweight loss estimates calculated on the assumption
that the income tax reaches full investment returns will be
far too large. 220 To the extent the wraparound insurance
shelter is driven by the low tax rate on the risk-free rate of
return, my proposal would not affect that incentive. 22'
Domar-Musgrave analysis thus provides additional nuance
to arguments against deferral of tax on inside buildup.222
Not only does the current tax system impose different
rates on different assets, progressive tax rates may cause
gains and losses to be taxed differently on the same assets.
Professor Zelenak recently suggested that if a progressive
Haig-Simons income tax is the societal preference, then the
patchwork of risk-related returns triggered by progressivity
"is likely to be appropriate. ''223  That is, assuming
progressivity is desirable, it may follow that taxation of risk
triggered by such progressivity is also desirable. Even if one
accepts this proposition, the pattern produced by our
current rate bracket structure is not likely to subject the
most affluent to different rates on gains than on losses.224
218. See Weisbach, supra note 216, at 229-30.
219. Id. at 230.
220. Id. at 239-40.
221. Indeed, my proposal may increase the attractiveness of the benefit for
the risk-free return if the increase in the nominal rate of tax on the risky
returns triggers a reduction in any implicit taxes (i.e., contract fees). See infra
notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
223. Zelenak, supra note 10, at 900.
224. See id. at 901 (noting that the $336,550 top rate bracket is "modest"
and that "taxpayers with significant wealth" will not face loss tax rates that
differ from their gain tax rates); see also Weisbach, supra note 11, at 39
(explaining that the current rate structure "does not do very much" of causing
gains to be taxed at a higher rate than losses).
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As explained by Professor Zelenak, "[f]or the sometimes-
taxation of risk premium under a graduated rate income
tax to be attractive it would have to affect the wealthy as
well as the merely affluent, and it would do so only if rate
graduation extended throughout the income
distribution."225
Of these tax rules interfering with Domar-Musgrave
preconditions, none-with the exception of progressivity
(which is really a separate normative issue)-are part of a
normative income tax. The various loss limitation rules, for
example, operate to limit the sheltering opportunities
resulting from the realization requirement. Differential
taxation of economically similar products and transactions
contributes to tax sheltering and also increases the costs
associated with tax planning even in transactions that do
not rise to the level of tax shelters.226
In addition to the effect tax rules have on Domar-
Musgrave effects, portfolio adjustments in the real world
are likely to be complex and will not be costless-both
conditions that will likely negatively affect the ability of the
unsophisticated and less wealthy to avoid a tax on risk.227
With respect to complexity, it is difficult to imagine
taxpayers consciously engaging in the calculations
seemingly required for real world Domar-Musgrave effects.
Professor Weisbach argues that "[t]axpayers living within
the systems . . . merely need to make investment decisions
based on after-tax prices. . . . [T]axpayers could be
completely unaware of the types of adjustments discussed
in the models while conforming to the predicted
behavior. ' 228 Notwithstanding this possibility, in the case of
complex investments, such as variable insurance, after-tax
225. Zelenak, supra note 10, at 901.
226. See Schizer, supra note 131, at 1314 (describing how inconsistency in
the taxation of similar transactions leads to "wasteful tax planning").
As described in supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text, these costs may be
tied most closely to the rate at which the risk-free return is taxed-and thus,
may not trigger deadweight losses as large as usually estimated.
227. In addition, risk aversion may cause taxpayers to make adjustments
that, while maximizing utility, do not result in the complete elimination of the
taxation on risk. See Zelenak, supra note 10, at 895 (describing Ethan Yale's
work on this point).
228. Weisbach, supra note 216, at 241.
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prices may not be readily apparent. Less sophisticated
individuals, in particular, may have a difficult time
understanding the various factors, including fees, affecting
the product's after-tax price and may be susceptible to
aggressive marketing tactics.
Transaction costs also interfere with taxpayers' ability
to make Domar-Musgrave portfolio adjustments. To return
to Trevor taxpayer and his $1 wager,229 taking out a loan to
double his initial wager is unlikely to be costless in the real
world. Only if loan expenses (e.g., interest and amortizable
origination fees) are fully deductible and his bet pays a risk-
free return matching loan expense payments as to amount
and timing will doubling his bet be costless. 230 If loan costs
exceed the risk-free rate, then the tax burden depends not
on the risk-free rate but on the loan interest rate.231 Since
borrowing costs are tied not only to various administrative
tasks performed by the lender but also to the
229. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
230. The risk-free return earned on the non-borrowed investment will, of
course, not be eliminated by doubling the bet. To illustrate, assume that the
coin flip does not take place immediately after Trevor puts up his $1 so that
there is a risk-free return associated with the bet. Assume that this return will
be paid regardless of bet outcome and that this return equals six cents per $1
wagered. Assume also that Trevor is able to borrow at the rate of six cents of
loan expenses (all deductible) per $1 borrowed. The timing of the receipt of the
risk-free return from the bet and the payment of the loan expenses coincide; the
payment of the tax and the receipt of any tax deduction coincide.
In the no-tax world, Trevor would not have to borrow and would have six cents
of risk-free return at the conclusion of the investment. In a 50 percent tax
world, Trevor borrows $1 to double the bet in order to eliminate the tax on the
risky return. The $2 invested earns twelve cents of risk-free return. Trevor
must pay six cents of tax on this amount-three cents attributable to his
original $1 and three cents to the borrowed $1. Trevor had the remaining six
cents to pay loan expenses, and will get a three cent deduction as a result. Thus,
he is able to generate the money to pay the loan expenses because the risk-free
rate and loan expense rate is the same. He is able to cancel out the risk-free
return associated with the borrowed $1 because of the loan expense deduction,
but he is not able to cancel out the three cent tax attributable to his original $1.
231. See Cunningham, supra note 10, at 39 ("To the extent than an
investor's borrowing rate is higher than the risk-free rate and she uses
borrowed funds to adjust her portfolio, the burden of the normative income tax
on capital income is equivalent to a tax on the investor's wealth equal to the
product of the investor's borrowing rate and the nominal tax rate.").
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creditworthiness of the borrower, wealthier borrowers will
generally enjoy lower borrowing costs. 232
Transaction costs for wealthier taxpayers may also be
lower as a result of more subtle interactions. The current
income tax system offers various low tax-rate opportunities.
Variable insurance provides one such opportunity. If the
rate of tax is zero on policy inside buildup (which, though
unrealistic, 233 makes for easier illustration), taxpayer
Trevor would only have to wager $1 through a variable
insurance contract in order to achieve his no-tax world risk
level. 234 The zero tax rate would, however, be anomalous
when viewed from the perspective of the entire tax system,
which exacts higher nominal tax rates for comparable
returns existing outside variable insurance. A portion of
variable contract fees likely reflects insurance companies
taking advantage of this tax rate differential.
While this phenomenon is generally referred to in terms
of tax capture or implicit taxation, such fees may also be
analogized to borrowing costs. 235 Just as more favorable
terms are generally available to wealthier borrowers,
contract fees vary with the affluence of the purchaser. That
is, the ability to take what is, in effect, a full deduction for
all costs-including mortality costs-paid out of cash value
creates variance in these fees in a way that favors the
affluent since the value of a deduction increases with rate
bracket increases. Lack of wealth and sophistication may
also lead to an increase in policy cancellations and other
forms of early withdrawal, which will increase contract fees
and may trigger tax penalties. 236
232. See id. at 39; see also Schizer, supra note 12, at 1905-06 (noting that
the wealthy "can borrow at low cost, if not at quite the risk-free rate").
233. See supra Part I.B.
234. This also provides an illustration of the way after-tax price can
substitute for a more complex portfolio adjustment. See supra note 228 and
accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. To the extent
transaction costs are characterized as implicit taxes, they may be analyzed as
contributing to tax rate differentials on the risk-free return. See supra notes
218-21 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
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C. Tax Shelter Reform and Domar-Musgrave
Considerable overlap may exist between the taxpayers
best able to avoid tax on risk and those who make use of tax
shelters. This suggests that Domar-Musgrave implications
should be examined when dealing with incremental reform
aimed at tax shelters. Such an analysis may provide
additional insight into the mechanisms of the shelter and
help evaluate the likely effects of the proposed reform. A
more difficult question is the extent to which Domar-
Musgrave should be used normatively. The possibility that
incremental reform should be implemented to facilitate,
when possible, the non-taxation of risk may seem
counterintuitive given that the wealthy and sophisticated
are already in the best position to obtain this result. If,
however, one assumes Haig-Simons as the normative goal,
then most methods of taxing risk through an income tax
system require departure from that goal. 237 The implication
is that in order to implement reform that facilitates the
non-taxation of risk, one need not aim for Domar-Musgrave
results-aiming for Haig-Simons is sufficient.238
237. Of course, departures from Haig-Simons are relatively commonplace in
the current income tax system, and they occur largely because of various
obstacles to removing the realization requirement. See supra Part III.B.
238. See Weisbach, supra note 11, at 36 (describing interaction of Domar-
Musgrave and Haig-Simons).
As indicated in the introduction, this Article does not address whether risk
should be taxed-it addresses only whether it is taxed under Haig-Simons and
the current system. It seems safe to assume, however, that if it were decided
that risky returns should not be taxed and a system were designed to
accommodate that goal, Congress would wish to provide investment incentives.
The potential targets for congressional largesse in such a system are clear. As
described supra Part III.A, taxpayers are not able to use portfolio adjustments
to eliminate the income tax on risk-free returns. In addition they cannot use
such adjustments as to wages or inframarginal returns. Thus, with respect to
investment assets, the clear candidate for which to provide subsidy treatment is
the risk-free return component of such assets. See Schizer, supra note 12, at
1900-01 (describing the difficulties individuals have in adjusting wage income
since they would "presumably have to do more work"); Weisbach, supra note 11,
at 19-20 (explaining that to the extent inframarginal returns do occur, portfolio
adjustment cannot be used to "eliminate the tax" on them). My proposal thus
also provides a limited exploration of how a subsidy could be constructed in
such a system.
Another method for implementing a preference for risk-free returns would be to
provide for a zero tax rate on all the returns of the investment asset. See
Schizer, supra note 12, at 1924 (describing the use of zero rate for risk-based
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Haig-Simons does not mandate a particular rate
structure, and the most efficient way to implement directly
Domar-Musgrave might be to impose a zero tax rate on
risk-related returns. 239 Professor Schizer suggests, for
example, that variable life insurance reform (as to the risk-
based returns) may not be necessary-assuming a zero rate
applies to both risk-based gains and losses under these
contracts. 240 As a general matter, zero rates may be difficult
to legislate. Even in the case of variable insurance, several
legislative adjustments would be required since a zero rate
will not be a typical result for many variable life insurance
contracts, and a potential zero tax rate does not apply to
variable annuity contracts. 241 Drawing the risk-related
returns out of the contracts and marking them to market
should allow for Domar-Musgrave results comparable to
those afforded by a zero rate while still allowing for
progressivity. 2 42
returns as being "[i]n some ways ... the simplest and most radical approach").
Professor Auerbach's method suggests another relatively simple approach to
providing a deferral benefit to holders of insurance contracts. See Auerbach,
supra note 160. At contract surrender, tax could be assessed using the final
cash value to determine the risk-free returns, but an interest charge would not
be assessed. The absence of the interest charge would provide the contract
holders with the benefit of deferral. Tracking investment in the contract and
marking cash value to market would not be required. In order to tax correctly a
contract on which partial withdrawal of cash value had occurred prior to the
final withdrawal date, additional calculations would, however, be required.
Professor Auerbach describes an approach to dealing with distributions
occurring prior to realization. See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 173.
239. The retrospective method provides for such a result. See supra note
160.
240. Schizer, supra note 12, at 1936 ("A provocative implication of this
analysis is that these investments do not require special attention [because of
the] zero rate applicable to insurance. . .
241. See supra Part I.B.
242. This assumes that the suitable clientele for variable insurance products
does not differ substantially as between a zero-rate approach and my proposal.
See Schizer, supra note 12, at 1892 (explaining that a zero-rate system "does not
allow policymakers to apply progressive rates to risk-based returns"). In order
to allow for taxation of risk arising as a result of income tax progressivity, the
gains and losses should be classified as ordinary and taxed according to the
individual's rate bracket. As discussed in Part III.B, because the rate brackets
are fairly wide, it is possible that most risky gains and losses on variable
insurance would be taxed at the same rate even after application of the rate
brackets. If one wished to enhance further Domar-Musgrave effects, an explicit,
uniform rate could be used to tax both gains and losses. See Schizer, supra note
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In addition to risk taxed because of the structure of the
current tax rules, risk may also be taxed because of failures
to make portfolio adjustments. It perhaps goes without
saying that minimizing such failures is desirable-
particularly since such failures are likely to be most
common among the less sophisticated and wealthy. 243 While
necessarily speculative, my proposal may enhance taxpayer
ability to make adjustments through lowering transaction
costs. Implementation of my proposal will allow for removal
of the current anti-shelter devices, 244 which impose
monitoring costs and artificially restrict underlying contract
investments to insurance-only funds. Nominally taxing risk
may also lower transaction costs to the extent such costs
represent tax benefit capture on the part of insurance
companies. 245 Further, the requirement of separately
stating contract elements-including fees-will increase
contract transparency and thus should help foster
competition.
CONCLUSION
Variable life insurance and annuities are complicated,
problematic financial products. My proposal preserves most
of the current tax treatment of these products, but imposes
taxation of the risky returns, thereby allowing for
relaxation of the current anti-tax shelter rules and
potentially enhancing taxpayer ability to understand these
products. Additional effects of this separation of risk-free
and risky returns depend on the extent to which nominal
taxation of risk is avoided through taxpayer portfolio
adjustments. My proposal takes Domar-Musgrave
considerations into account to some extent, but by imposing
nominal taxation, it is also responsive to the view that risk-
related returns are meaningfully taxed by the current,
progressive income tax system.
12, at 1908-09 (describing uniform treatment of returns from the same
instrument as necessary to achieving Domar-Musgrave balance). If differences
between the nominal tax rate on risky returns on economically similar assets
affect transaction costs, selecting a rate between the highest individual rate and
the highest capital gains rate may help neutralize such effects.
243. See supra Part III.B.
244. See supra Part I.C.2.
245. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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